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PREFACE
Within the last decade state-of-the-art cable television
has gone from an unsuccessful, premature proposal in Virginia,
to operative franchises in several jurisdictions , including
Richm::m.d, Henrico, Chesterfield, Arlington, and Alexandria.
There are also a number of franchises which have been in operation
for many years and which are intended largely for reception
improvement with sone minimal extra services, such as those in
Petersburg, Hopewell and Colonial Heights.

It is proposed here

to raise significant issues which could have been addressed by
Virginia state and local government as to the regulation of this
rapid growth of cable television in the Cormnnwealth, especially
given the trend toward deregulation at the Federal level which
might leave regulatory responsibility with the state and localities.

Examples from the governmental response to that growth

will be used to dem:mstrate the need for a comprehensive study
of regulatory alternatives.

They will also show that to a

significant extent, Virginia has already cormrl.tted itself to a
regulatory scheire which apparently is to regulate in the public
interest, but which, in fact, neither has the resources nor the
authority to do so.

Further, it will be apparent that this

decision has been made largely by default.
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The Virginia General
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Assembly has failed to act, either through ignorance of the
potential of the medium, or a reluctance to regulate or delegate
authority to localities to do so.

Only the barest regulatory

framework for local governmental :initiative has been promulgated, and only a minimal corrmit:rrent has been ma.de to giving
localities the resources necessary to exercise that responsibility.

The Conm:mwealth consequently finds itself with a cable

regulatory scheme which is neither fully relevant to the
characteristics of the iredium or capable of fostering the public
interest.
This study will involve necessarily a description of
some of the major aspects of the legal and political environment
within which governments cooperated in, reacted to, or :initiated
this process.

Further, the extent to which certain feasible and

legal options were considered in an effort to create a sophisticated system reflective of community needs will be noted, as
will the legal problems of the largely irrelevant process of
local governmental franchis:ing.

It will be necessary to address

briefly certain other points, such as the technical possibilities
of cable television at this time and its likely future development, comparison of the systems offered and chosen in the recent
Virginia experience with the state-of-the-art, the economic
factors limiting the feasibility of particular systems attractive
to multiple system operators (MSO's), and the social and political
implications of choices ma.de :in the franchising and regulatory
process.
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Having addressed these subjects, it will be possible to
assess the impact of the legal and political environment upon
regulation of cable television by state and local goverrment in
Virginia, with the focus being on a comparison of the alternatives
available with actual results.

Here questions shall be raised

as to the appropriate roles of state and local regulation; as to
the rationale for authorizing local governmental regulation on
the basis of the franchising process and the relevance of principles
of franchise law to the cable television industry; and even as
to the relevance of traditional Virginia local government law to
the attainment of conmmity cable television objectives.

This

shall require examination of the legal options, such as regional
franchising and deregulation, taken by other jurisdictions, both
nationally and in Virginia; of case law precedent, both for
franchising generally (e.g., Cablecom-General of Virginia, Inc.
v. City of Richm:md, et al. ) , and for such related considerations
as antitrust law (e.g., Comnunity Corrrnunications Co. v. City of
Boulder, Colorado), privacy protection, whether against private
or public owners, First Amendment principles, and local government law (e.g., Virginia's Dillon Rule).

It shall be necessary

to analyze whether or not under Virginia law cable television is
to be treated as a public utility or a luxury, a public improvement or a conmercial enterprise, and the implications of such
decisions for local governmental regulation.

Based upon this

foundation, the task then will be to point to the weaknesses
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found in the legal tools available to Virginia local government
in decisionrnak.ing on such

i~sues,

and to suggest that this

reflects a failure of the legal and political system itself to
meet the challenge of a rapidly developing and potentially
important new technology.
No effort will be made to describe a IIDdel regulatory
scheme for Virginia and its localities.

Rather, this study will

explore the issues to be addressed in developing such a program,
the possible benefit to the public interest in doing so, the
lack of initiative on the issue, and limitations inherent in any
such regulatory effort.

The objective will be to raise impor-

tant issues not yet addressed in a developing field. To respond
to those issues would be premature.

It is not premature, how-

ever, to demonstrate the necessity for a comprehensive analysis
of this issue.

In fact, in Virginia it may be too late, since a

number of significant franchises have already been let.

This

study will derronstrate that no such decisionmaking process has
as yet been carried out in the Corrm:mwealth, and that significant long term comnitments have been ITade without such guidance.
Experiences from several jurisdictions with different cable
television records, and located in three of the state's Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Northern Virginia, the Tricities,
and the Richm:md area, will be discussed to illustrate the state
and local response to such issues and the regulatory status of
the medium at this point.

The thesis of this study is that

state government has defaulted in its regulatory responsibility
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by leaving regulation to the efforts of local governments which
have neither the legal

auth~rity,

the technical expertise, nor

the political inclination to do so effectively.
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CHAPTER 1
GABIE 'IEIEVISION IN VIRGINIA
Cable television in Virginia represents a cross section
of the medium nationally, consisting of both older reception
improvement systems, such as that in Damascus, which was begun
in 1949; and nrultiservice systems in excess of thirty channel
capacity currently under construction or recently operational,
as in Richm:md and Arlington.

As might be expected from a

medium developing over thirty years of changing objectives and
technology, system size varies significantly.

Operational

systems range from the very small, such as Rich Creek with fifty
subscribers, to those of rroderate sizes, as in Roanoke with
eighteen thousand, five hundred subscribers.

Systems under

construction have even greater potential size, as in Arlington,
with a franchise area population of over one hundred, seventyfive thousand.

As of 1980, at least eighty-five systems were

operational or in the advanced planning or construction phase in
the Corrm:mwealth.

Of these, however, at least sixty-two use

twelve channels or fewer.

Such reception improvement systems

are not the main subject of this study, since they no longer
represent the state-of-the-art.

Also, they were established

primarily for television reception purposes, while to call the
state-of-the-art systems television is alrrost a misnomer.
Actually, the focus of this paper is the developing cable

1
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infonnation mediun.

Two such systems in the Tricities area will

be noted, however, for cornparative purposes.

Of those sixty-two

basic systems, five have gone into operation since 1977, and
twelve have a capacity, which is not fully utilized, of IIDre
than twelve channels.

Only two systems, however, Haysi with

three and Jonesville with eight, have less than a twelve channel
capacity.

Only nine systems developed before the current stage

of growth began in 1977 have and use a capacity beyond twelve
channels,and these include the extraordinary situation presented
by the Reston planned corrmun.ity system.

Clearly, the nature of

the mediun's developIIEilt in Virginia changed dramatically in the
late 1970's.l
For the comparative purposes of this paper, the cable
television experience in three markets:

Tricities (the Cities

of Petersburg, Hopewell, and Colonial Heights), NortheTil Virginia
(the Cotm.ties of Arlington and Fairfax, and the Cities of
Alexandria and Fairfax), and the Richm:md Metropolitan area (the
City of Richm:md and the Cotm.ties of Henrico and Chesterfield)
will be examined.

The franchising process was conducted in

these markets at different tines, t.mder different social,
political and legal conditions, and at different stages in
industry developIIEtlt.

Emphasis will be placed on the City of

Richrrond, since the process there exernplied several of the
shortcomings of the current Virginia experience with state-ofthe-art systems.

NortheTil Virginia will exhibit experiences

lBroadcasting--Cable Yearbook 1980 (Washington, D.C.:
Broadcasting Publishers, Inc., 1980), pp. G261-G267.
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with similar systems, but with somewhat rrore sophisticated, if
not much rrore successful, an. approach.

The older twelve channel

systems of the Tricities area are examined primarily for derronstration of the challenge of the developing cable industry,
which challenge tjemands both flexibility and resources apparently
beyond many Virginia local governments, and for the consequences
of these deficiencies.
The Northern Virginia Experience
NLnnerous inquiries from cable system operators to the
Arlington County administration prior to 1970 led the county to
request that the General Assembly authorize Virginia counties
specifically, as well as other local jurisdictions, to franchise
and regulate the cable television industry.

The minimal response

was the passage of Va. Code§ 15.1-23.1, which shall be mentioned
later.

Upon completion of a study by the Arlington Public

Utilities Conrnission, which had as one of its objectives an
ordinance which was ''flexible and would give the County the
tools to protect the public interest in the face of changing
teclm.ology," the Council passed its cable television ordinance
on February 13, 1971.
Solicitation of bids from over sixty finns was issued on
Jtme 15, 1971, and five applications were received from Arlington
Telecomm.mications Corporation (ARIEC), Arlington Corrmmity
Television Co. , Inc. (ARCOM) , Northern Virginia Cable Centers
(NVCC), TelePrompter (TPT) and the Corporation for Systems
Research (ARSYSTEMS), four m:mths later.

Several public hearings
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and work sessions were held by the Corrmission, which refused to
meet in executive session wi,,th any of the applicants, and rankings
and recorrmendations were presented to the Board of Supervisors
on January 10, 1972.

A public hearing in March resulted in

referral to the PUC for additional information.

This process,

in which any applicant was pennitted participation, resulted in
a PUC recorrrnendation in Hay that a "conditional certificate" be
granted to ARTEC, which the Board granted on August 5.

In

September, Warren Braum was hired as negotiator to assist in
development of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity,
consideration of numerous drafts of which followed.

A Certificate

was awarded to ARTEC on March 3, 1973, and an application in May
filed with the Federal Comm.mi.cations Corrmission (FCC) for a
Certificate of Corrpliance.

Final authorization did not cone

until August 19, 1975, primarily because of issues raised by
Washington broadcasting stations.

AR1EC came into full com-

pliance with the Cable Ordinance on December 16, 1975, by
posting the required bond.2
Initial service by the three lu.mdred, sixty mile, thirtysix channel system with six goverrrrrental educational channels
and one for public access, was delayed until July, 1978, primarily because of financing difficulties.3 At its opening, FCC
2rnterview with Jerry K. Emrich and Charles G. Flynn,
Arlington County, Virgiriia, 21 November 1980; Washington Post,
16 July 1978, sec. C, p. l; and Washington Post, 7 January 1979,
sec. K, p. 5.
3washington Post, 7 January 1979, sec. K, p. 5; and
Washington Post, 9 February 1978, sec. Va., p. 1.
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Comnissioner Joseph Fogarty characterized ARIEC as a prototype
for future systems nationally, with its services for colID.ty
government and schools and corrmunity infonnation, programning
and shoppers guides and traffic signals.4 Two years later,
before completion of the system, the Board of Supervisors
deregulated ARTEC rates, despite service complaints, despite the
fact that access canrritments had not been IIEt, and despite the
fact that rate regulation was perhaps the rrost effective regulatory power of the Board.

AR'IEC contended that lack of public

access had resulted primarily from the fact that priority had
been given to the completion of wiring.

In support of deregulation,

it was contended that cable television was not a rronopoly,
similar services being available from broadcast nEdia in the
Washington area; and that being the case, that philosophical
considerations which the Board folID.d persuasive should dictate a
free market.

Also of importance was the fact that, even given

the availability of a public utilities conrnission that would
make it one of the rrost capable of Virginia jurisdictions,
complex rate regulation was probably beyond the colID.ty staff's
resources.
regulation.

The Board did retain the authority to reinstitute
It was interesting to note that at the saIIE t:i.rre,

ARTEC was indicating an interest in renegotiation of terms requiring creative programning and public access. 5
4washington Post, 19 July 1978, sec. D, p. 2; and
Washington Post, 7 January 1979, sec. K, p. 5.
5washington Post, 29 JlID.e 1980, sec. A, p. 13; and
Washington Post, 10 July 1980, sec. Va. , p. 6.
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While the Arlington .franchise awaited FCC approval, City of
Alexandria officials considered initiating a cable franchise, but
failed to do so when little interest developed.

In 1978, however,

solicitations were requested, and three companies, including an
ARTEC subsidiary and the Alexandria Cablevision Company (ACC) ,
submitted bids in 1979.6
Interestingly, the issue of rate regulation, as opposed to
free market rates set in competition with other IIEdia, was involved in the Alexandria procedure from the beginning.

That

city's Council only retained the option for the Cable Administrator to regulate, upon request of Council.

This was apparently

in agreement with the position that rate regulation could increase
the influence of politics on the franchising process, since only
those with enough political power to get rate increases would
bother to apply.7
Just as would be the case in Richrrond, the primary factor
considered in awarding the Alexandria franchise, aside from
political pressure, was the financial ability of the bidders to
perfonn, one difference being, however, that it was a local
citizens group, the Consumer Affairs COITITiission, which advocated
this position strongly in conjunction with the consultant.

In

doing so, it is interesting that one of the few economic advantages of regional systems was found to be true in the Alexandria
6washington Post, 15 April 1978, sec. B, p. 1; Alexandria,
Virginia, Ordinance 2383, 26 June 1979; and Washington Post,
5 March 1979, sec. C, p. 1.
7washington Post, 28 June 1978, sec. B, p. 7.
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system, that being that the ARTEC subsidiary had no need to build
an additional broadcasting !'.ower in Alexandria, which the other
bidders would. 8 In the end, this and other regional considerations
did not succeed.

Perhaps they were even a hindrance for ARTEC,

or, as Council member Robert L. Calhoun stated, "I would like us
to do som=thing on our own in this city rather than be a part of
an empire."9 Interjurisdictional rivalries have often constituted
the major obstacle to a regional system in Northern Virginia.10
ALTEC was given the highest rating by the city's cable
television administrator and its financial consultant, based on
financial strength, m:magernent experience, realistic projections,
and public service advantages, including a two-way capability.
Council, however, detennined to award the franchise to ACC, but
deferred the award until additional infonna.tion could be obtained
concerning what the city's consultant characterized as "serious
deficiences" in its financial arrangements. Finally, on June 19,
1979, the franchise was awarded to ACC.

In a

due process com-

plaint that was also heard in Richm:md, ALTEC severely criticized
Council for receiving additional infonna.tion from one bidder after
the deadline for bid submissions, but net only with an opinion of
the City Attorney that Council was within the law in doing so.

In

an extraordinary action, the successful bidder ACC also corrplained
8washington Post, 8 March 1979; sec. B, p. 5.
~ashington Post, 20 June 1979, sec. B, p. 1.

lOinterview, Emrich and Flynn; Interview, Maston T. Jacks
and Michelle R. Evans, Alexandria, Virginia, 21 November 1980;
and Interview, Phil Tyman, Washington, D.C., 13 November 1980.
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about due process violations by the City's staff and consultant
during the process.11 Both complaints, however tmfounded legally,
•

point to the need for the type of franchising guidelines required
later by Chesterfield and Falls Church.12 Not only were such
procedures absent in the Alexandria case, but a new Council took
office in the middle of the award, leading to such problems as
suggested additional tenns in the perfonnance contract concerning
the City's right to purchase the system if its perfonnance were
fotmd inadequate.

The contract was signed, however, on July 26,

1979,13 and the stringing of cable finally began in July, 1980,
for a thirty-five channel "tiered" system which would allow
flexibility in consumer choice of service, and which would eventually provide such two-way service as alanns as well as channels
for leasing for business and personal use. 14 The fact that the
system is two-way "active," as opposed to being susceptible to
later conversion to two-way, constitutes a significant system
advantage, despite the fact that this may have resulted from a bid
error.15 Service in sane parts of Alexandria began in late
October, 198o.16
llwashington Post, 13 June 1979, sec. B, p. 8; Washington
Post, 27 June 1979, sec. C, p. l; and Washington Post, 4 July 1979,
sec. C, p. 7.
12rnterview, Stephen L. Micas, Chesterfield Courthouse,
Virginia, 20 Noverrber 1980; and Falls Church, Virginia, "Cable
Television Franchising Procedures Ordinance," 1980.
13washington Post, 10 July 1979, sec. C, p. 3.
14washington Post, 10 July 1980, sec. Va., p. 6.
15rnterview, Jacks and Evans.
16Tuid.; and Municipal Highlights:
Virginia, Noverrber 1980, p. 6.

City of Alexandria,

9

On October 23, 1978, the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors
voted unaninnusly to seek bids for a consulting finn to develop a
cable television ordinance, and to authorize the hiring of a
"special manager" to work as liaison between the staff and the
consultant.

It was anticipated that the ordinance would be drafted

within six months.
Valid concern that the process be cautiously conducted was
expressed, despite some consternation that the county was not
already further along towards cable service.

There was even some

sentiment for observing the experience in Arlington before proceeding too far, and perhaps for waiting until late 1979 to go out
for bids.

It was recognized by mmy, as Supervisor Martha V.

Pennino stated, that the cable franchising issue presented "one of
the most important decisions we will ever m:ike; '' or put mre
dramatically by one supervisor, that "this is either the greatest
thing coming down the pike for Fairfax or a horrible IlDilSter."
Unfortunately, county profit, in the nature of a business privilege
tax, was a major motive fran the beginning.

AR'IEC was one of the

five £inns initially interested.17
As late as May, 1979, one of the mst respected national

cable television consultants, Malarkey, Taylor and Associates of
Washington, D. C., evaluated Fairfax County as a marginal risk for
a franchise.

Due to a low population density and local require-

ments for much underground work, it was anticipated that a system
could expect approximately ten years of losses.

Both Arlington

17washington Post, 26 October 1978, sec. Va., p. 18.
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and Alexandria had population densities of nore than twice that of
Fairfax County.

It was note@l, however, that the County was a

prestige area near the nation's capital, with a relatively high
per capita income.

As a means of mitigating capital expenditures,

it was recorrmmded that the county be divided into three service
areas, ideally with a different franchise in each.

The unincor-

porated, planned cormn.mity of Reston, within ·which Warner-Annex
Cable Corp. already operated a system without a franchise, 'WOuld
constitute one area, with the rest of the county being split into
two areas.

No plans involving subdistricting or networking were

involved.
Rapid technological developm=nts within the past year have
made possible a substantial increase in available services to
potential consurrers which are unavailable from broadcast media.
The resulting increases in the market for cable has made the
population density question ID.Jch less important.18

The three

franchise areas are being retained, but the two major franchises
will probably now go to the sane company.

With one franchisee,

there could be First Amendment problems with requiring different
programning in subdistricts.
Any earlier misgivings about the feasibility of the system
have not been evidenced by a lack of interest on the part of the
potential operators.

There are at least eighteen which have

18washington Post, 1 May 1979, sec. C, p. 2; Washington Post,
8 April 1980, sec. C, p. l; Washin~ton Post, 27 December 1979; and
Interview, Richard A. Golden, Fair ax County, Virginia, 19 November
1980.
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exhibited interest at some point.

The Board of Supervisors

approved, on April 7, 1980, the three district plan, and at the
same time inexplicitably refused a proposal to give a citizen's
comnittee a role in awarding the franchise. 19 Since that tiIIE,
whether it was involved with the Board's decision on citizen
input or not, that decision may have been indirectly vindicated.
As a result of what at least appeared to the Board to be an

especially unfortunate example of "rent-a-citizen" franchise
practices, a controversy has developed over acceptance by the
Fairfax County Arts Council, a private group also accepting
county funds, of one percent interest in the subsidiary of
Storer Corrnrunications.

In tenns of appearances, the problem was

not mitigated to any significant degree by the fact that the
canpany contended that no Arts Council lobbying was intended,
and that the stock was only in return for programn:ing advice. 20
The county has since adopted one of the strictest cable financial
ownership disclosure ordinances in the nation. 21
On a less hopeful note, however, the Board has cone to the

conclusion that they are incapable, even with one of the nnst
sophisticated local staffs in. the Corrm:mwealth, of judging technological factors.

Also, the originally set deadline of December

19, 1980, for the receiving of bids to the Board has apparently
gone by the board as the governing body has called for a report on
19washington Post, 8 April 1980, sec. C, p. 1.
2CJwashington Post, 22 July 1980, sec. C, p. 1.
2lwashington Post, 8 August 1980, sec. C, p. 1.
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possible public ownership.

Despite Dillon Rule, antitrust, and

other legal problems with public local ownership, this should not
be surprising, given the Fairfax reputation for liberal interpretation of Virginia local government authority.22 1his study
could prove interesting though, since it could point to the fact
that most of these problems could be mitigated by legislative
action at the state level.

For instance, if cable television

could be classified as a public utility, regional construction and
operation of all or part of a system could be pursued under authority
granted in Va. Code§§ 15.1-304 through 15.1-307.
Elsewhere in Northern Virginia, the town of Leesburg granted
a franchise to Storer Corrmunications in August, 1980, after a
process which involved an arrangement with the 1.Dudoun Time-Mirror
that could result in a virtual ITKJD.opoly of local news on cable.23
Storer did not consider Leesburg especially promising in profit
terms, but instead saw it as a stepping stone to other franchises.
The fact that a corrm.mity of approximately ten thousand people,
with two to three thousand households, could be expected to
generate gross revenues of seven hundred, fifty thousand dollars
per year says a great deal about the relative importance of system
size for feasibility.24 This "stepping stone" issue also raises
significant networking questions in considering any future franchising action by 1.Dudoun County.
22washington Post, 8 August 1980, sec.
Emrich and Flynn.
23washington Post, 27 August 1980, sec.

c,
c,

p. l; and Interview,
p. 1.

24washington Post, 28 August 1980, sec. B, pp. 1, 10.
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Elsewhere in Northeni Virginia, the City of Falls Church
has begun consideration of a•franchise, but to this point has only
adopted ethical and other guidelines for the conduct of that
process.25 Prince William County has given sane initial consideration to cable television, but the Board of Supervisors has decided
to defer action.26
The Riclm:md Area Experience
The City of Riclm:md, in 1972, made its initial effort in
the cable field by advertising for bids.
proposed some form of local input.

Of seven subrrj_tted, four

The City Manager's recorrrnenda-

tion, however, was in favor of a company making no such offer.
Controversy over this issue ensued, and this, with confusion
engendered by changing Federal COIIIllllilications Corrmission regulations,
led Council to abandon the effort.

Also involved in this delay

was conceni that a Voting Rights controversy over the annexation
of a portion of Chesterfield County might affect any franchise
granted.27 It is ironic that this indirect impact offers one of
the few examples found in this entire study of a major effect of
the lavv upon the Virginia cable franchising process.
In 1977, a member of City Council, m::>st likely at the

prompting of early industry lobbying, requested the City Attoniey
and Administration to draft a second bid package and ordinance.
25rn.terview, William F. Roeder, Jr. , Falls Church, 14
November 1980.
26rnterview, Emrich and Flynn.
27Tuid.
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1he stated objective at that t:ime was the three percent revenue to
be generated for the City, revenue which tmder FCC guidelines was
designated to cover the cost of "regulation." Despite the fact
that the Administration felt that the City was incapable, especially
from a technical standpoint, to proceed 'With a franchise award at
that point, the new package was prepared.

It was based primarily

on that of Henrico Cow.ty, which had passed a cable television
ordinance on February 25, 1976, and Virginia Beach.28 A Notice of
Invitation for Bids was published on September 1, 1977,29 after
minor changes had been made by the consultant, Warren L. Bratm,
who had been hired at the suggestion of the "Manager, and by
Cotmcil. 30 1he issue of local control over the system and access
to it was addressed only once in the Notice, and this was merely
to ask whether or not any local control of access would be offered.
Apparently, this was done "out of an abtmdance of caution," based
on the local control controversy in 1972.31 1his, and the indirect
assistance of the Washington consulting firm which drafted the
Henrico and Virginia Beach papers, was almost the extent of outside
non-industry participation in the planning phase.

Other input was

apparently limited to minor suggestions by the Ford Fow.dation.
28rnterview, Daniel W. Allen, Richmond, Virginia, 2 December
1979.
29warren L. Bratm, . : .C.: : ,ity;: ;.i.--=o-=f:. _Ri: :.: ;:.c=hrmn.::.;..:.::~d..::..:--='C:,:.a: :.b: :.le.;:____;T: ,;:e:. : l:. : e., ;,.vi: :.·s::...:i:::..:on=--=B-=i=ds
Response Analysis. Harrisonburg, Virginia: Warren L. Braw., Consulting Engineer, 1978.
30rnterview, Allen.
3lrbid.
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After the planning stage, and in fact after the submission of
bids, Council was also presented with a Report on Cable Television
in Ricbrn::md prepared by the Citizens' Research Coornittee on
Cable, which reflected the views of a large number of comrunity
organizations.32 This report is ID2Iltioned at this point since it
reflects the major voice for local control, but even so, its
" . . . prirnary concerns lay in the area of access to the system
by public and non-profit institutions." The issue of overall
control of the system and its resources was not of prirnary concern.
The Notice was sent to approximately fifty cable industry
entities.

Any effort to solicit potential local investments was

apparently limited to the local newspaper advertisement required
by law of all franchises for the use of public property, easements
or rights of way, a requirement of little actual relevance of the
cable process.33 Six nultiple system owners (MSO) submitted bids
through their local corporations, as follows:

Storer Broadcasting

Company, Cablecom-General, Inc., American Television and Corrm..mications Corp. , Continental Cablevision, Inc. , Cox Cable Corrmunications,
Inc., and Century Corrmunication Corp.34
The Citizens' Corrrnittee analysis of bids was presented to
the Council and the Manager on March 28, 1978, and its following
observations are interesting, particularly considering its emphasis
on access provisions:
32citizens' Research Corrmittee on Cable. Report on Cable
Television in Richm::md. Richm:md, Virginia, 28 March 1978, pp. 1-2.
§

33rnterview, Allen; and Va. Const., Art. VII,
15.1-308.
34Brat.m, City of Richm:md, p. 1.

§

9; Va. Code
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1.

None of the applicants made corrmitments concerning

reduced rates for corrrnunity group or government use of leased
channels.

ATC and Continental did offer to consider the possi-

bility, however;
2.

From the group's viewpoint, the only importance of a

local board was for citizen participation in local programning.
It was noted that marketing alone wuld not create an audience for
such offerings, which of their very nature are of relatively low
quality, and that only content, volunteer energy, and corrrm.m.ity
involvement would;
3.

Continental and American offered greater local board

control of public access channels.

Continental proposed that a

"Corporation for Coll1Ill.fility Access" be fonned by the City for the
purpose of establishing rules for the public access channel, for
conducting training programs in its use, and for coordinating its
use by City agencies and public institutions.

The initial board

membership was to be proposed by the Company, for Council approval;
4.

Corrments on two other proposals are interesting, in

that even the Citizens' Corrmittee felt that only national industry
expertise could produce a viable operation.

Cablecom, the company

which eventually filed suit over its loss of the franchise,
offered a board which was strictly advisory, and selected by the
company.

The Comnittee noted that this was ". . . not likely to

be the kind of instrument necessary to achieve the full potential
of commmity prograrrrning. '' At the other extreme, while the Century
board was to be a:irrk:)st totally independent of company control, the
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Comnittee objected on the ground that al.rrost no company assistance
in local programning was likely with this alternative;
5.

Finally, in the strongest suggestion throughout the

process for corrmunity involvement in the entire cable operation,
the Comnittee recorrrnended the fonnation of a Cable Television
Comnission to
--Oversee compliance with all aspects of the franchise
ordinance and bid;
--Evaluate any proposed changes in rates, initiated
either by the company, the Corrmission, or the public, and
make recorrrnendations to City Cotmcil;
--Hear complaints from the public or others concerning
the system and mediate or report to City Cotmcil;
--Insure jgat the system is operated in the public
.
interest . . . .
It was also suggested that the three percent franchise fee be used
to staff this Comnission. 1136
The Manager's consultant issued his analysis of the six
bids on April 10, 1978, and it was notable for the following
recorrrrendations:
1.

That Council "consider the first principle of applicant

qualification to be the relative financial strength of each bidder
. . . ,"and that the strength of the parent 1'150 and financial
comnitments·it had made elsewhere be given considerable weight in
addition to the strength of the local company.

Continental, which

35citizens' Research Comnittee on Cable, ''Report," pp. 3,
8-11, 28.
36Ibid.
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was eventually awarded the franchise, ranked only third in this
category.

ATC, which

even~lly

received an interest in the award,

was ranked first with Cox;
2.

That ''local ownership is only as important as the local

board membership is empowered to act on behalf of the MSO.

Most

of the considerations, such as channel carriage, rules of fairness,
EEOC, technical and other areas are mder the direct control of
the F.C.C . . . . . " Bram specifically left any detennination on
this matter to Comcil's discretion, and on only this issue and
that of canpany "character" made no analysis or recorrrrendation.
Proposed percentages of local ownership, which were minimal and
varied little, were reported, as follows:
Century, Cox, Storer and
Cablecom
Continental
ATC

20% each
up to 20%

16 - 19%37

After intensive lobbying by local citizens with investment
potential in the various local companies and by representatives of
the MSO' s, Council awarded the franchise to Continental.

This

came only after American withdrew in favor of Continental, having
reached an agreement to purchase an interest in the local company.38
While extensive additional research would be necessary to
confirm them, several preliminary conclusions can apparently be
made concerning the RichmJnd procedure .in this case, as follows :
37Bram, City of RichmJnd, pp. 11-1, X-1, X-1-3.
38Richrnond Tines-Dispatch, 28 May 1978, sec. B, p. l;
Interview, Allen; and Interview, Hall.
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1.

'While IIRl.Ch has been made about "political framework, 11

the local ownership groups ftom which Cmmcil had to choose all
represented the corrmunity with relative success.

It ma.y be

true

that the economic impact on various prominent local individuals
did not escape members of Council, but it has not been established
by substantial evidence to this point that this was a detenninative
factor;39
2.

Apparently, the chief objectives of all parties involved

in the process were limited to additional City revenue, local
control of public access channels, the technological sophistication
of services to be offered under the franchise, and the financial
ability of the franchisee to perfonn according to its proposal;
3.

Rather than establishing its own priorities and objectives

through planning prior to an invitation for bids, on the issue of
ownership or any other, Council for the rrost part reacted to the
input of industry lobbyirig, the "Manager's and Consultant's recommendations of a technical and financial nature, and perhaps some
limited corrrm.mi.ty pressure for involvement in control of local
access.

This is particularly relevant in light of the City

Administration's position that even on technical subjects, the
City was tn1prepared in 1977 to reinitiate the franchise process.
This, and Council's willingness to participate in ex parte discussions and executive sessions,40 at best should have been
39Richrrnnd Times-Dispatch, 28 May 1978, sec. B, p. 1.
4~chmond TiTIEs-Dispatch, 28 May 1978, sec. B, p. l;
Richrrond Times-Dispatch, 16 May 1978, sec. B, p. 1.
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expected to cause public confusion concerning their objectives
and the extent to which the award met them, and at worst to
raise questions of due process which, while not necessarily of
legal significance, could bring into public question the essential
fairness of the process and its conformity with the public
interest;
4.

Such confusion concerning the actual public objectives

of the process is evident in the filing of Cablecom-General of
Virginia, Inc. v. City of Richmond, et al. While a complex case,
and one which may have turned rrore on legal procedural questions
than questions of fact, the central issues were whether Council
had complied with Virginia law by awarding the franchise to
the ''highest and best bidder," an issue of ownership; and that
of due process and ex parte corrm.mications.

As might have

been expected, the Court refused to overturn Council's exercise
of its discretion in the absence of evidence of arbitrary and
capricious action.

Actually, it is difficult to conjecture how

such evidence could have been produced, since Council's criteria
for judgrrent were less than evident.

The plaintiffs based their

contention primarily on the reccirm2ndations of the City consultant. 41 If, however, one assumes that the primary objective
of Council was control of local access, then its choice of
Continental seems not at all unreasonable.

When this is coupled

with the participation of financially strong Anerican in the
local company, thereby meeting one of the Consultant's major
objections to Continental, the award is even rrore logical.
4lcablecom v. H.iclmmd, No. 790387 (Richrrond Circuit
Court, Div. II, Decenber 11, 1978).
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Had Virginia law required, as the literature suggests,
that the Council publish its, reasons for decisions on franchise
issues,42 an opportunity would have been available at least for
the production of evidence.
have been avoided.

Perhaps the controversy could even

'That ass1..1I11es, of course, a willingness for

candor in such situations.

Chesterfield County becam= involved in cable television
franchising primarily because it would have been politically
untenable not to do so, since RicbmJnd and Henrico citizens were
to have soon the service available.

The County administrator

was of the opinion that the County had insufficient population
density to support a system and that if any MSO could provide
service, it would be Continental, which had received the other
area franchises.

Both analyses proved to be incorrect.

Despite

the latter, and despite the cultural diversity of the County,
between its northern suburbs and southern and western rural
corrmunities, no regional neb\Qrking approach was ever considered.
Actually, the fact that Continental had franchises in adjoining
jurisdictions probably was detrimental to its bid.

It ITDJSt be

rerneniliered in this regard that interjurisdictional dispute
between Chesterfield and Richm:Jnd played a significant role in
the demise of an earlier attempt to establish cable in RicbmJnd,
as well as the prevalent opinion in Chesterfield government that
any cooperative effort with the two adjoining larger jurisdictions
42walter S. Baer, Cable Television: A Handbook for
Decisiornnaking (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1974), p. 82.
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results in a lower level of service for Chesterfield citizens.
MOre specifically, however, pointing to the importance of both
careful planning and interjurisdictional cooperative effort, it
was essentially too late for Chesterfield to be a part of such a
network; Richm::md and Henrico had already acted and planned
their systems.

Also, in another rare instance of the law

indirectly affecting the cable franchising process, Richm:md was
once again in litigation (Cablecorn), which would discourage
interjurisdictional negotiations for changing the status quo.
Also, cooperation was unlikely before the issue of annexation
irrrnunity for certain urban counties, including Chesterfield and
Henrico, was settled by the 1979 and 1980 sessions of the
General Assembly.

On

a rrore lTD..lildane level, the county admini-

stration also realized that there vvould be very little economy
of scale even if Continental obtained all three franchises.
The Chesterfield process was indirectly an excellent
example of the potential usefulness of standarized procedure.
The ordinance was developed by the County Attorney, but was
essentially a synthesis of the Richm::md and Henrico ordinances;
and the bid application was almost identical to that used by
Henrico.

It was felt that there were few technical problems

with this, since the Henrico application had been so recently
developed.

The primary distinction of the Chesterfield ordi-

nance was that it attempted to avoid excessive regulatory
reporting, without diminishing the County's regulatory role.
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One of its primary objectives was flexibility, both by the
inclusion of an overly vague provision for maintenance of $tateof-the-art service, and by requirements of a contract and perfonnance bond.
The only consultant hired by the county was Telecom of
Kansas City, Missouri, which was only to evaluate bids received;
but the Board of Supervisors did adopt, and follow, strict
guidelines for the award process, which avoided the type of ex
parte contact problem which helped lead to the RicJ:m::md litigation and which is prevalent in the cable industry's relationship to government, including the FCC.

Specifically, late

submissions were prohibited, unlike in Alexandria.43
Following the analysis of bids, the County Administration
was inclined to recorrrnend acceptance of that of Continental.
This was not primarily because of any substantial differences as
to service, but instead largely because Continental, on the
advice of its attorney, State Senator Frederick T. Gray, had
avoided the practice, so typical in such procedures, of bringing
local pressure to bear on the governing body.44 Storer had not
hesitated to take the "rent-a-citizen" route, using local ownership by prominent citizens.

The County Administration feared

that similar pressure could be used in thwarting regulatory
efforts. In a decision which is excellent evidence of the primary
importance of the political factor in detennining the outcome of
43rn.tervi~, Micas.

44rbid.; and Intervi~. Hall.

24
cable franchising processes, Storer received the franchise on a
vote of three to two.
A small area of the County has recently gone into service.
Storer apparently is well financed and has evidenced a willingness to make significant front-end capital expenditures.

The

principle problem so far has involved only minor slippage in
meeting installation deadlines.

No evidence of use of the

political clout of local owners to weaken regulatory efforts has
been encountered.

The consumer response to the system is in-

dicated by a relatively high penetration rate and an average
bill of approximately thirty dollars per nonth, as compared to
the basic service charge of six dollars and ninety-five cents.45
The Tricities Experience
In the Tricities Area, two antiquated twelve channel

systems in three jurisdictions, originally designed for reception
improvement and m:in:i.rnal additional service, were granted new
franchises with only those changed provisions absolutely required to be made by March 31, 1977, by the FCC' s Cable Television
Report and Order, 37 F. R. 3252 (1972).

The changes were made on

the initiative of the companies involved, in the same marm.er as
earlier franchises had been granted in Petersburg and Colonial
Heights.

It is ironic that this was done at the same tilre as

Arlington's "prototype for cable television nationally" was
being qeveloped.
45rnterview, Micas.
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The Colonial Heights and Petersburg franchises do operate
as a unified system.

No ser}-ous consideration has ever been

given, however, to joint operation of this system with that in
Hopewell on a regional basis, which could rreke a wider range of
prograrrrning and access services IIDre feasible.46 Nor has any
plan been advanced for dividing such a regional system into
subdistricts which could be IIDre responsive to the diverse
dem:::>graphic characteristics of the area.

Several observations of relevance to this paper can be
made about the cable franchising experience in all three areas.

As to the historical setting, cable operations in Virginia can
be divided into

two

basic categories, those being the limited

capacity reception improvement systems, and the high capacity,
multi-service systems.

The former category contains, by far,

the majority, but since 1977 the trend has been toward the
latter.

Prior to that date, the less sophisticated operation

was the rule, with the exception of a small number of systems in
some of the larger cities and in one planned corrmunity.
Secondly, the franchising processes exhibited several
prevalent characteristics, as follows:
1.

industry initiation of the process and of system

specifications;
46rnterview, Michael R. Packer, Petersburg, Virginia,
12 Noverrber 1980; Interview, Carl R. Pigeon, Hopewell, Virginia,
12 November 1980; and Petersburg, Virginia, "Sarrrnons Comrunications, Inc. , Franchise Ordinance," 1977.
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2.

issuance of a franchise in any one jurisdiction in a

region having an impact on all other jurisdictions in the region;
3.

interjurisdictional rivalries, resulting in failure

to consider regional networking possibilities even when raised;
4.

frequent subordination of the public interest, in

such issues as ownership options, to the political influence of
potential local owners;
5.

the need for strictly adhered to franchising due

process standards, and for demanding standards for citizen
input;
6.

the high priority given to franchising as a source of

local govennnental revenue, with such revenue to be used for
general purposes rather than regulation or public system development;
7.

the minimal grant of authority to localities by the

state, and alrrost no evidence of necessary guidance as to standardized procedure or review of technical and financial factors;
8.

confusion over the proper extent of local regulation,

for instance as to rates, and lack of sufficient local expertise,
even in the m:::>st sophisticated jurisdictions;
9.

the importance of the goal of flexibility in authority

to meet the demands of technological developrrents during the
franchise period;
10.

the relative unimportance of population density or

system size, when compared to dermgraphics, in the analysis of
system feasibility; and
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11.

the deficiencies of the estalished Virginia franchising

process as applied to the
technology.

li~etls:ing

and regulation of a new

CHAPI'ER 2

LOCAL AUillORI'IY IN CABLE FRANCHISING IN VIRGINIA
Central to the question of effective local governmental
action in Virginia in the cable television franchising process,
in addition to the consideration of available resources and
expertise raised above, is the legal authority required to make
use of any such resources and expertise; and this raises the
question of the role that Virginia law and its underlying political foundations allow for local government.
As is often the case, the lack of clear legislative

mandate has created a confusing situation ripe for litigation.
Dillon's Rule may aggravate this by engendering questions as to
the validity of much local action.
There can be no question that Virginia long has
followed, and still adheres to, the Dillon Rule of strict
construction concerning the powers of local governing
bodies.47
In judging the extent to which adequate statutory direction has
been given to Virginia local governments, it must be remembered
that they are "creatures of the State which are entirely subordinate to it" and that they can exercise no greater powers
471973 Rep. Att'y Gen. 37; Cormonwealth v. Arlington
Board, 217 Va. 558, 573, 232 S.E.2d 30 (1977); and Howard
Gan, An Introduction to Cable: Som= Basic Technical Infonnation
and a Look at the Regulatory and Legal Fram=work," Charlottesville,
Virginia, 18 August 1980.
Count~
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than those conferred upon them.48 The surrrnarized statement of
the often cited rule, is to the effect that Virginia local
governments possess only those powers granted expressly, or
''necessarily or fairly implied in or incidental to the powers
granted expressly, or those powers "essential to the declared
objects and purposes" of the local government, which is to say
not only convenient, but indispensible.49 While the rule has
been interpreted in some jurisdictions to allow inference of
powers "reasonably necessary to effectuate a power expressly
granted," as opposed to those absolutely necessary, it is
probably nost accurate, and nost realistic for the task here, to
state the Virginia rule as holding that "[a]ny fair, reasonable
doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the
courts against the corporation and the power is denied. 1150 The
rule has in nost instances in Virginia been strictly construed.
This has even been the case in its application to grants of the
police power, and has especially been true in the interpretation
of county authority.51. It is true that in a related situation,
.481978 Rep. Att'y Gen. 37; 207 Va. 827, 15 S.E.2d 270 (1967);
1979 Rep. Att'y Gen. 240; Board of Supervisors of Fairfax Coun v.
Horne, 216 Va. 113, 215 S.E.2d 53 1975 ; and 13 Michie s Jurisprudence Municipal Corporations §§ 26-16 (1974).
49city of Richrrond v. Board of Supervisors of Henrico County,
199 Va. 679, 684 (958); 1976 Rep. Att'y Gen. 64.
50connelly v. Clark CounJY, 307 N.E.2d 128, 130 (Ill. App.
1973); City of Richmnd v. Boar of S~ervisors of Henrico County,
199 Va. 679, 684 (1958); 1976 Rep.Atty Gen. 64.
51A. E. Dick Howard, CoI11Ilentaries on the Constitution of
Virginia (Charlottesville, Va. : University Press of Virginia,
1974), p. 810.
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concerning the authority of localities to set rates for telephone
service, the Virginia

Supr~

Court has held that the legislature

can "abandon" authority to localities by "clear intendrnent"
without the use of express words.

In light of precedent, however,

it is probably wise for local governments to follow the prest.nIIption against doubtful authority, since, as the Court noted,
" . . . the difference, if any, between 'power expressly con£erred' and 'power conferred clearly and by express intendment'
is so shadowy as to be indistinquishable. 1152

It should be noted

in passing that local governments have the express authority to
regulate cable rates in Virginia. 53
In accurately assessing that cable television franchising

and regulatory authority, however, three factors must be considered.

The first, and rrost apparent, is that Dillon's Rule

itself stands in Virginia not only through judicial precedent,
but through legislative mwillingness to abrogate it.

The

Comnission on Constitutional Revision proposal in 1971 to
abandon the rule, to treat county and city authority rrore unifonnly, and to establish home rule in the amendment of charters
by the local electorate, all in a new Section 3 of Article VII
of the Virginia Constitution dealing with the authority of the
General Assembly to provide for the powers of local governments,
was not approved by the legislature.

Those proposals, in fact,

52City of Ricbrmnd v. Chesa1eake and Potomac Telephone Co.
of Va., 127 Va. 612, 105 S.E. 127 195 ).
53va. Code § 15.1-23.1.
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met with IIDre legislative opposition than any other.

This could

simply have been indicative pf the traditional reluctance to
take ''too tmsettling a departure from known patterns, '' or to
open the door to too many uncertain effects.

It rrost likely

also indicates though a detennination on the part of the legislature to maintain strict control over local governments, since
one of the rationales expressed in debate for maintenance of the
Dillon Rule was that any excessively narrow judicial interpretation of local authority could be reversed by the General
Assembly by special act.54 Such cohesive control of local level
initiative has not only legal, but traditional political underpinnings as well.

The unified control of local activities by

the Byrd organization was for many years a distinctive characteristic of Virginia politics.

Such aspects of the organization

as the State Compensation Board, which plays a major role in the
determination of local governmental salaries; and the selection
by the legislature of Circuit Court judges, who at one time
exercised significant political and governmental influence
through their appointive powers, were designed specifically for
the maintenance of such control.

That authority was not only

held, but exercised as well, as in the absolute stiffling by the
organization through state government of any local initiative
in opposition to massive resistance or in favor of liquor-bythe-drink. 55 One corrrnentator has gone so far as to say that
541975 Rep. Att'y Gen. 132; and Howard, pp. 791, 811, 822.
55J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, ~ B¥od and the Changing
Face of Virginia Politics, 1945-196~rottesville: University
Press of Virginia, 1968), pp. 31-33, 35, 132-1333, 193, 222-223.
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[t]he history of the Byrd organization denonstrated the
hypocrisy and sterility of the strict states' rights
ethic. The machine's states' rights views conflicted
with other conservative conrnandrrents. Under such
practices and policies as the State Compensation Board,
the circuit judge, massive resistance, and state bottleonly liquor laws, local powers and initiative were
severely llll.dennined.56
It cannot be expected that any such strict state control, long
held and long exercised, would be quickly relinquished, or
reversed by a conservative judicial system.

This also points

out, however, that the option of doing so does exist, if the
public interest demands it.
A second consideration is that Virginia local governments
do have Constitutional franchising authority which, while it may
limit some of the flexibility necessary to an effective cable
process , has been interpreted in many situations in favor of the
localities.

The Virginia Constitution, and statutory provisions

pursuant to it, not only authorize, but specifically impose a
procedure by which rights to use public property or easenE11ts in
cities and towns are to be granted.57
The authority to grant pennission to use public streets
has been held in Virginia to infer the authority to attach
conditions to that grant, despite the implications of the Dillon
Rule.58 Also, once a franchise is granted, its interpretation
56Ibid., pp. 347-348.
57va. Const., Art. VII, § 9; Va. Code§§ 15.1-307 to 316.
58southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Richrrond, 98 F.
671; aff'd. 103 F. 31, 44 C.C.A. 147; appeal dismissed 22 S.Ct. 934,
46 L.Ed. 1264 (1900).
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is frequently in favor of the locality.

II

. . [A]n ambiguous

or doubtful contract between. a . . . company and a rrn.micipal
corporation as to the rights of the public, will be construed in
favor of the public rights."59

In a field as rapidly changing

as broadband cormn.mications, it is forttmate that no franchise
holder can expand upon its rights tm.der a franchise by inference
from equivocal or doubtful provisions. 60 Interestingly, this
results from a legal presumption that the tenns of the franchise
were written by the franchisee. 61 All too often in the past
this has been the case.

Also, it could be useful in some cable

situations, especially several years into an excessively inflexible
franchise, that even "exclusive" franchises cannot be held to
bar the further exercise of the franchise authority. 62 · Finally,
Virginia c0tm.ties, cities and towns have been given the authority
to regulate cable television by express grant, as follows:
§ 15.1-23.l; Licensing, etc., and regulation of
cormJLIIli.ty antenna television systems.-- . . .

The governing body of any cotm.ty, city or town may
license, franchise or issue certificates of public convenience and necessity to one or nnre cormrunity antenna
59city of Richrrond v. C & P Telephone Co. of Va., 127 Va.
612, 105 S.E. 127 (1958).
60Atlantic Greyhotm.d Corp. v. Corrm:mwealth, 196 Va. 183,
83 S.E.2d 379 (1954).
61Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Co. v.
Richm:m.d, Fredericksburg &Potomac and Richmond & Petersburg
Railroad Connection Co., 145 Va. 266, 133 S.E. 888 (1926); City
of Richrrond v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Va., 205
Va. 919, 140 S.E.2d 683 (1965).
62snidow v. Board of Supervisors of Giles County, 123
Va. 919, i4o S.E.2d 683 (1965).
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television systems, and impose a tax thereon; may regulate such systems, including the establishment of fees
and rates, and assigJ'lREnts of channels for public use and
operate such channels assigned for public use, or provide
for such regulation and operation by such agents as the
governing body may direct. In exercising the powers
granted in this section, the governing body shall confonn
to rninirrun standards with respect to the licensing,
franchising or the granting of certificates of convenience and necessity for corrmunity antenna television
systems and to the use of channels set aside for general
and educational use which shall be adopted by the Virginia Public Telecorrmunications Board; such minimum
standards being for the purpose of assuring the capability
of developing a statewide general educational telecornrrn.mications network or networks; provided, however,
that the owner or operator of any corrmunity antenna television system shall not be required to pay the cost of
interconnecting such corrmunity anterm.a television systems
between political subdivisions.
Also, Va. Code § 2.1-563.10.14 establishes as one of the seventeen
duties of the Virginia Public Telecorrmunications Board that of
ensuring" . . . the provision of assistance to the political
subdivisions of the Conrnonwealth in matters relating to cable
television and other public telecormn.mications facilities,
services and entities . . . . " This remains, apparently, one of
the Board's lowest priorities.

For future reference, three

points should be noted:
1.

The authority granted is pennissive, not mandatory;

2.

Only minimal state standards, or assistance in

limited situations, are provided for; and
3.

Substantial limitation is placed upon the authority

to require intercorm.ection between systems in different jurisdictions.
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In light of the unwillingness evidenced by these statutes
to interject the state into the cable regulation arena to any
significant degree, it is appropriate to address briefly the
question of division of authority between the state and localities.
The State Corporation Comnission is charged with the duty
of "regulating the rates, charges, services, and facilities of
all public service companies" in Virginia. 63 Given the general
definition of the tenn "public utility," and the nature of the
cable television industry and particularly its use of public
rights-of-way, allowed by local goverrnnents for the provision of
public service, it would be difficult to propose that cable
television should not come within such regulation.

McQuillin,

for instance, defines a public utility in tenns which describe
state-of-the-art cable television services fairly well:
[I]n order to constitute a public utility, the
business or enterprise must be impressed with a public
interest, and those engaged therein must hold themselves
out as serving or ready to serve all rnernbers of the
public to the extent of their capacity, and the nature of
the service must be such that all members of the public
have an enforceable right to demand it . . . . 64
Just such requirements are typical of franchise ordinances, and
use of public property would probably be tmjustifiable if they
were not.

In detennining whether or not

sec

regulation would be

appropriate, however, one must also consider the related issues
of whether or not cable television constitutes, as utilities
63va. Code § 12.1-12; Va. Const., Art. IV, § 2.

6~cQuillin, § 34.08; citing Dispatch v. Erie, 249 F. Supp.
267.
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typically regulated by the SCC do, a

COIIIIlJil

carrier or an

industry necessarily involvipg a natural m:mopoly.

That the

corrm:m carrier status of the industry has been a major issue for
some time is undeniable.

Its current status, however, in that

regard is tenuous, despite the fact that it practically can be
so operated and despite the public policy benefits from such
operation that have been noted.

In a landm:rrk case for the

industry, the Supreme Court in 1979 struck down Federal Corrmunication Corrrnission public access regulations, which the Corrmission
had claimed authority to impose as reasonably ancillary to
achieving its legitimate objectives in the regulation of television broadcasting.

'The Court stated that

With its access rules, . . . the Corrrnission has
transferred control of the content of access cable channels
from cable operators to members of the public who wish to
corrmunicate by the cable medium. Effectively, the Commission has relegated cable systems, pro tanto, to
corrnvn-carrier status. A corrnnn carrier service in the
corrmunications context is one that 'makes a public offering
to provide [ corrm.mications facilities] whereby all members
of the public who choose to employ such facilities may
corrmunicate or transmit intelligence of their own design
.
65
and ChOOSJ.ng
• • • •
It was also held that this was violative of § 3 (h) of the
Corrmunications Act of 1934, to the effect that "a person engaged
in . . . broadcasting shall not . . . be deemed a corrnnn carrier. ''
It specifically was held that this not only precluded a presl1mption
by the Corrrnission that a broadcaster was a corrnnn carrier, an
65Federal Corrmunications Corrmission v. Midwest Video Corp. ,
et al., 440 U.S. 689, 700-703; 99 S.Ct. 1435, 1441-1443; 59 L.Ed.2d
692, 702-704 (1979); and 47 U.S.C. § 153 (h).
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interpretation which the language of the Act might reasonably
allow, but also evidenced a Congressional intent to protect
journalistic freedom by proscribing corrnnn carrier treat:rrent in
any event, even in the case of the cable television industry
with its utility-like technology.

The Court specifically

declined to rule on potential Constitutional challenges which
might arise from other access requirements which would allow
greater editorial discretion, as in the case of the fairness
doctrine.66 What effect the various proposals for amendment of
the Comnunications Act in the nature of deregulation would have
on the current local practice in Virginia of requiring some
public access is, of course, open to question.
Utility status would require, as has been seen, a public
purpose or a purpose at least involved with the public interest,
just as would also be the case in any effort at local public
ownership.

In the case of such ownership, or even considering

only franchise fee revenue, the TIEre fact that the public sector
profits financially in a proprietary manner from an enterprise
is not sufficient to grant public purpose status, although the
use of such profits to subsidize public purpose broadcasting
might mitigate this limitation.67 The fact that the service can
only be provided by the use of easements.• in some cases gained
by eminent domain, and that the service in oost cases, ignoring
66Tuid.
67Jarnes W. Perldns, Tax-Exerrpt Financing of CarrmmityControlled Cable Television Facilities (Cambridge, Mass.: Center
for Economic DevelopTIEnt, 1976), pp. 6-7.
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some of the recent developments in individual satellite reception,
cannot be obtained by individuals alone except at very high
cost, could in the first case be utility status by the facility's
own bootstraps, or in the latter could be mitigated by its
possible luxury characterization.

The public purpose involved,

however, does not consist simply of the use of public easements,
as has been seen.

The potential future use of broadband comm.mi-

cations as a major social and cultural resource rrust also be
considered.

Ironically this could be established IIDre clearly,

given enhanced state or local goverrnnental regulation, for
reasons analogous to the Federal tax exemption situation.68 If
local governments were to aggressively address the social and
political nature of the medium and the use of its prof its, as
opposed to the more corrmercially oriented objectives of the FCC,
the public purpose question would be clearer.

Utility status is

also tmclear due to the continuing contention of many that, due
primarily to competition from other media, cable remains a
luxury instead.69
The natural monopoly question is similarly unresolved.
Because of the expenses involved in the duplication of trunkline,
if nothing else, competition between companies is unlikely.70
68Tuid.' p. 9.
69Brenda Fox, "An Introduction to Cable: Some Basic
Technical Infonnation and a I.Dok at the Regulatory and Legal
Framework,'' Charlottesville, Virginia, 18 August 1980.
70Roger G. Noll, et al., Economic As ects of Television
Regulation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973 , p. 195.
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There are a number of situations in which this might not be the
case, however, as where the .demand for channels is high, 71 or
where an older system has becorre antiquated. 72 The rronopoly
question is also tmcertain because of the fact that, while the
plant may be a natural monopoly, prograrrrning rarely is; and to
separately regulate or operate the two can cause problems, as in
detennining rate base allocations in rate regulation. 73 Legally,
however, all of the Virginia ordinances examined were specifically nonexclusive, and there is substantial question whether
any other alternative would be available tmder Virginia lBJ.N. 74
The question of rronopoly is clouded on rrore practical
legal grotmds, however, by the fact that even where competition
might economically be possible, its use as a tool by local
government is limited, if for no other reason than by the threat
of vexatious litigation.

Admittedly, the situations in which

competition would be feasible are few, since in n:nst cases price
cutting to achieve even a slightly lower cost per subscriber
through increased penetration would likely result in an tmstable
system leading to only one operator.

This, of course, would not

be the case if any system had reached capacity without satisfying
71Ibid., citing Richard A. Posner, "Cable Television: The
Problem of local Mmopoly," RM-6309-FF (Santa Mmica: Rand Corp.,
1970).
72Interviev, Micas.
73B. R. Allenby, "Deregulation Proposals and the Cable
Television Industry" (M.A. thesis, University of Virginia, 1974).
pp. 86-87.
74Interview, Emrich and Flynn; Interview, Jacks and Evans;
and Interview, Golden.

40

demand, 75 as in the situation of older systems with few channels
and services technologically. incapable of expansion.

Even so,

the local goverrnnental willingness to use competition through
issuance of a second franchise IDuld be diminished by the alm::>st
certain prospect of suit by the original grantee, whether well
founded or not, if on no other grounds than contract.

Negotiation

for improverrents, with use of competition as an implied threat,
is probably as much as the locality can hope to obtain. 76 No
better example of the practical limitations of cable franchises,
and the concomitant need for careful planning for future flexibility, exists.
In any event, the Commnwealth of Virginia has chosen to
limit its involverrent in the process to that enunciated in §
15.1-23.1, and this substantially leaves out any role of the

sec,

which regulates the activities of the following public

service companies as provided by the Constitution and expanded
by statute:

railroads, telephone, gas, electric light, heat;

power, and water supply, pipeline, sewers, telegraph; and corrmm
carrier transportation companies.7 7 The decision has also been
made by enactment of § 15.1-23.1 that cable television is an
enterprise which, while not an essential utility in the strict

75Robert E. Babe, Cable Television and Telecorrrnunications
in Canada: kl Economic hlalysis (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan
State University, Graduate School of Business Administration,
Division of Research), 1975), pp. 56-57.
76can, "Introduction to Cable"; and Interview, Tyman.

77va. Const., Art. IX, § 2.
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sense, requires regulation beyond that involved with controlling
the use of public property.

Otherwise, franchising authority

would not have been given to cmmties, in nost of which the
public roads are controlled by the State, and none of which have
constitutional franchising authority.78
To point out the deficiencies of state initiative is not
to say either that they are without cause or that localities
should not be left with significant discretion.

Perhaps the

reason that government at both the state and local level in
Virginia refuses to take a nore aggressive approach is related
to the readiness of private enterprise to treat the rredium as a
corrmercial enterprise, and the resulting reluctance of a conservative judicial system to find a public purpose for regulation
or ownership, which one might expect to find under such circumstances. 79 Also, experience indicates that state utility
cOIIIDission regulation can lead to increased delay, confusion,
and costs of reporting and carnpliance, to be passed on to the
subscriber.SO Be that as it may, there is justification, beyond
just the regulation of the use of public streets, for significant local control.
Zoning, for instance, is a function jealously guarded by

local goverrments in Virginia, and for technological reasons,
site selection for cable facilities is intricately involved with
78Howard, pp. 857-858.
79Perkins, p. 7.
80Allenby, p. 70.
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the land use question.

Frequently there are as few as three or

four sites available iii even a large cOIIITIUnity for the headend
site, primarily for reasons of interference from existing or
future land uses, and the role of local goverrnnent in both
selecting and protecting such sites is important.

This is

especially true of systems using midband and superband frequencies,
since they are shared with military, police, business, weather
radio, aircraft, navigation, and citizen band uses.
systems using frequencies below 30

Two way

MEiz for upstream signals are

also especially susceptible to interference from very high
powered transmitters.

This can create particular problems in

converting one way systems, so it is apparent that any locality
anticipating even the possibility of such a conversion IIR.ISt
plan, and not only in its cable activities, from the beginning
to make this as feasible as possible.

Site selection by the

franchisee and the locality can involve computer prograrrming,
aerial surveys, ground based measurerrents, and a review of both
system and extrasystem signal strength and azim.lth bearings.

It

must attempt to anticipate both private and public sector improvements, such as water tanks, which might appear at first to be
unrelated, but which could constitute interference in the electromagnetic spectrum; as well as the availability of services to
the system itself, such as an emergency power source in large
corrmunities not susceptible to total power blackout.Bl It would
be difficult to overestimate the importance of this process, or

Blcunningham, pp. 122-123, 172, 197, 326.
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the cooperation of the localities in the exercise of zoning,
plarming and police power authority, in m3king adequate service
"
possible, especially in rapidly
developing cOITIIllll1ities.

. . . At the present time the electromagnetic
spectrt.ml is becoming polluted by spurious signals from
transmitters and incidental radiation from noncorrm..mications devices. Undoubtedly, if a catastrophe in
cOITIIllll1ications is to be avoided, the day will come when
pollution of the spectrt.ml is considered as serious as
pollution of the atmosphere. Unfortunately, that day
hasn't arrived, and until then the system operator m.ist
do his best to select a site as free as possible from
interference. He m.ist also keep a watchful eye on
industrial developm2Ilts in the area that might later lead
to interference. Sarne types of interference require a
great deal of imagination to anticipate . . . 82
Perhaps one of the m::>st important reasons for local
regulation, and one of those issues least effectively addressed
in the franchising process required of local governments by
current Virginia law, has to do with adequate standards for
dealing with citizen-subscriber complaints.

Local government is

uniquely capable of responding to this regulatory need, and it
is important that objective standards be promulgated in the
franchise itself for dealing.with potential problems.

Otherwise,

there is no way to judge complaint validity, or seriousness of
complaints, the public will itself have no objective way of
judging the effectiveness of the local governmental effectiveness, and the city could be left open to a charge of favoritism
to the MS0.83 This is especially

true

of a situation so sus-

ceptible to the viscissitudes of local political pressure.
82Ibid., pp. 122-123.
83Baer, p. 110.
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Nonetheless, flexibility of local response is just as
important as the enunciation of perfonnance standards.

The

ultimate sanction of termination or nonrenewal is rarely credible,84
and for this reason the provision for perfonnance bonds and
security funds fotmd in some Virginia ordinances, but not in
some of the older ones, are important.SS In passing, it can be
noted that an effective local response demands such flexibility
in the franchise generally, and especially as regards future
additional regulations as rapidly developing technology radically
alters the meaning of "state-of-the-art" service.
Without adequate system specifications from the beginning
the risk is run of inadequately planned growth causing serious
technologicai problems which can actually make state-of-the-art
performance impossible or at best make judgrn=nts concerning
system perfonnance tmcertain.

Prime examples are the addition

of channels or the conversion from one to two-way service.86
Many systems installed within the last decade, including those
in the Tricities and especially those installed pr:inia.rily for
reception improvement, are for practical purposes limited to
twelve channels; and with the smaller twelve channel system, it
is often everi difficult to predict whether additional channels
are possible.87
84rbid.
85e.g., Richrrond Ord. 77-168-157, § l; Contracts §§ 11.D.
and 12. Such provisions are not f0tmd in any of the Tricities
ordinances.
86ctmningham, pp. 195-196.
87Ctmningham, pp. 212-213; Micas; Cunningham, p. 196.
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The most effective franchise will be that ordinance which
establishes only the organic.. framework for operation regulation,
leaving specifications to a subordinate contract or certificate
of necessity (which infers a decision by the governing body both
less apparently exclusive and involving broader connrunity and
economic considerations than the franchise alternative) subject
to change as local conditions and technological developments
require.88 Thus, not only does generality of tenns make construction of the ordinance more likely to be favorable to the
locality and the public interest,89 but it leaves a greater
possibility of modification of agreements as changed circumstances require, in protecting that interest.

Requirements

concerning future modifications within the franchise term should
not themselves be overly vague though, as in requiring only that
the franchisor ''keep up with the state-of-the-art." The fleY.ibility this would allow would be rrore than outweighed by the
extent to which this would leave the planning for such increased
sophistication to the franchisee, according to its standards,
and to which the authority of the locality to make specific
requirements _would be open to question which might lead to
litigation.90 Even such vague provisions for future modification
are preferable to none at all, however, as is the case in several
Virginia jurisdictions.
88rnterview, Micas ; and Baer, p. 140.
89Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Comm., 196 Va. 183, 83 S.E.2d
379 (1954).
90Baer, pp. 206-207.
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On a related point, it is also unwise to impose technical

requirements by reference tq, those of the FCC, which have an
uncertain future. 91 Perfonnance by Virginia localities varies
considerably on this point, from those provisions such as §§
2(5), 4, 16, and 17 of the Colonial Heights ordinance, which
impose only FCC requirements and anticipate no federal deregulation; to those like §§ 7.B. and 9.H. of the Richm:md ordinance,
which do anticipate local authority at least on some points in
the event of deregulation permitting local action; to those
exemplified by the Fairfax County ordinance in Article 7, §§
4(a), 5(a), and 6(a), where the FCC is relied upon, but a concurrent local role is anticipated, as well as the possibility of
deregulation.

Im. inspection of several local ordinances evidences a
wide disparity of perfonnance on the question of technical
requirements.
Northern Virginia
The Arlington County Code, §§ 41-4 (h) and 41-9 (e),
address this issue specifically, as follows:
§ 41-4 (h)

The company shall undertake any
construction and installation as may be necessary to keep
pace with the latest developments in the state of the
art, whether with respect to increasing channel capacity,
furnishing improved converters, instituting two way
services, or otherwise.
§ 41-9 (e)

(e) After receiving recorrrnendations from the
agency and the county staff, giving due regard to technological limitations, the board may require that any part
91Gan, "Introduction to Cable."
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or all of the system should be improved or upgraded
(including, without limitation, the increasing of channel
capacity, the furnishjng of improved equipment, and the
institution of two-way transmission), it nay order such
improvement or upgrading of the system, to be effected by
the company within a reasonable time thereafter.
The Alexandria Code, §§ 7B-44 and 7B-66, offer even IDJre
specific standards:
(e) The city council nay require that any part or
all of the cable television system should be improved or
upgraded by the franchisee within a reasonable time
thereafter (including, without limitation, the increasing
of channel capacity, the furnishing of improved equiprrent,
and the institution of two-way transmission) ; provided
such improvement or upgrading of the system is found to
be economically feasible. For the purpose of this subsection, a finding of economic feasibility shall rrean a
finding that the capital costs to the franchisee of such
improvement or upgrading can reasonably be arrortized over
the then remaining life of the franchise.
§ 7B-66. Functions of administration. . . . The
administrator's powers and responsibilities shall include,
but not be limited to, the following functions . . .

(k) To conduct evaluations of the system at least
every three (3) years, with the franchisee, and pursuant
thereto, make recornrn211.dations through the city manager to
the council for arrendrnents to this chapter or to the
franchise agreement.

Alexandria Franchise Contract, paragraph 3
3. This contract shall not relieve ACC from the
requirements of the applicable ordinances, and it is
understood and agreed that the City reserves the right to
impose such additional regulations or ordinances as it my
[may] deem reasonable with respect to ACC in particular
or cable television generally.
The Fairfax County Code, Chapter.9, Article 5, § 3,
however, contains a provision which would probably be difficult
to enforce, given its vagueness.
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Section 3.

Franchise review.

It shall be ths= policy of the Cotmty to amend a
franchise, upon application to a Grantee, the recorrrre.ndation of a Cable Television Administrator, or upon the
Board's own motion, when necessary or advisable to enable
the Grantee to take advantage of advancements in the
state-of-the-art which will afford it an opporttmity to
more effectively, efficiently, or economically serve its
subscribers or the Cotmty; provided, that this section
shall not be construed to require the Cotmty to make any
amendment for such purposes.
Richmond Area
The Richm:md Ordinance No. 77-168-157 (Contract Paragraph
16), is similarly vague, and has the added disadvantage of
relying on FCC regulations which may cease to exist.

It also

apparently leaves the greater initiative for system :improvement
to the operator.
B. It shall be the policy of the City to amend
this Franchise, upon application of the Grantee, when
necessary to enable the Grantee to take advantage of
advancements in the state-of-the-art which will afford it
an opporttmity to more effectively, efficiently, or
economically serve its Subscribers; provided, however,
that this section shall not be construed to require the
City to make any amendment. Further, within the tenn of
the Franchise, Cotmcil shall hold a public hearing, the
purpose of which will be to consider System performance,
System design modifications, and the possible need for
reasonable and appropriate modifications in the Franchise
of a nature that would not result in effectively terminating same tmder the then existing Federal Corrm..mications
Comnission Rules for Cable Television. This Franchise
may be amended at any time in order to conform with the
applicable Federal law and FCC rulings after notice and
public hearing.
The Henrico Ordinance No. 458 (1976), Article III, § 3,
is alnnst identical.
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The Chesterfield Code § 7.1-29, offers a rrodification
provision which is so extraordinarily vague as to be of questionable
use; despite the fact that it is not atypical:
The County hereby expressly reserved the following
rights:
(a) To adopt, in addition to the provisions
contained herein and in the franchise and in any existing
applicable ordinances, such additional regulations as it
shall find necessary in the exercise of its police pCJWer
provided, hO'Wever, that such regulations, by ordinance or
otherwise, shall be reasonable and not in conflict with
the rights herein granted.
(b) To revoke, amend or rrodify the franchise
granted pursuant to this chapter should the Federal
Corrrnunications Corrrnission, as a result of its certification or registration process, require that substantial
sections of the chapter, be altered or deleted.
Ironically, the same Chesterfield Franchise Agreement, §
6, offers an interesting example of response to inflexible
system obsolescence, which should constitute a warning:

§ 6.

Purchase of Sarrm:ms Broadcasting System.

Franchisee agrees to negotiate in good faith to
purchase from SarrmJns Broadcasting System the cable
system already in existence in Ettrick serving 340
customers within Chesterfield Cotmty so as to pennit the
service of such area in.a manner consistent with the rest
of the County. The Franchisee shall of fer SarrmJns a fair
and reasonable price to purchase capital equipment of
such system and upon purchase of the system shall upgrade
the system so as to be consistent with the quality available in the.entire County as soon as practicable. If by
July 1, 1980 the Franchisee has bargained in good faith
with SarrmJns and ma.de a fair and reasonable offer for the
system within the judgment of the Cotmty, but Sarrm:>ns has
refused to sell such system; the Franchisee shall be
permitted to extend service to the area already served by
Samrons consistent with the franchise agreerrent.
The Sarrnx:ms facilities, operating as part of the PetersburgColonial Heights system in Chesterfield without a franchise, were

so
so outdated as to make it of little use to Storer.

An offer was

made, but, as might be expected, was low and was not accepted. 92
•
Tricities Area
The three franchises neither require, by reference or
otherwise, any technological standards beyond FCC regulations,
and reserve no right to impose further state-of-the-art requirernents.

There are, however, counterbalancing factors.

The best

franchise ordinance probably would specify technological matters
to the point of requiring a m::>dular design for the system,
which, while being initially m::>re expensive and requiring a
conceptual design of the system and its expansion from the
beginning, would allow the ordinance to state clear objective
standards for future development without m:ijor retrofitting or
obsolence problerns.93

None of the ordinances examined m:ide

such provision.

The lack of legislative direction as to the perfonnance
of local goveTillD2Ilts in cable franchising process creates a
situation which begs for vexatious litigation, as Cablecorn
derronstrates.

Probably no better example exists than the

experience in Alexandria.

Shortly after two Cmmcil members

called, apparently with little legal justification, for an
92Interview, Micas.
93Baer, pp. 195, 206-207.

51
investigation by the AttoTiley General of the bidding procedures
used, one bidder called for the renoval of certain Council
members for threatening to cause difficulties in their future
city business should that company file suit for any reason.94
1he number of questions left unanswered by Virginia law is, in
fact, myriad.

For instance, if the public utility status of

broadband corrrnunications is questionable, there is question as
to the extent a locality can resort to eminent doma.in to acquire
easerrents in situations where to do otherwise would ma.ke service
unfeasible.

In the enforcement of a franchise, which is in the

nature of a contract, to 'What extent can the locality proceed
first in an action in contract, or is it necessary to go directly
into a mandamus proceeding, which Va. Code § 15.1-315 would
appear to allow, even if the remedy in contract was adequate.
To say this, however, is not to imply that state law is
devoid of direction, or that it alone is responsible for confusion on the part of local officials as to their proper role.
On

the first point, general franchise law could be considered.

Even if Federal law should deregulate franchise fees, state law
would still impose general franchise fee standards.95 The same
can be said of factors to be taken into account in rate regulation,
and enforcement guidelines. 96 But just as general franchise law
94washington Post, 18 July 1979, sec. C, p. 2; and
Washington Post, 31 July 1979, sec. C, p. 3.
95c & P Tel,hone Co. of Va. v. City of Newport News, 196 Va.
627, 85 S.E.2d 345 1955).
96cigr of Wheeling v. C & P Telephone Co., 82 W.Va. 208, 95
S.E. 653 (198); and Appalachian Power Co. v. City of Huntington,
210 S.E.2d 471 (1974).
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can answer some questions, it can raise others.

For instance,

one might ask to what extent a cable company operating a

two

way

system would be liable for failure to operate properly to a subscriber's detriment, in a way analogous to the liability of a
telegraph company.

Perhaps the legislature should address this,

and if not, perhaps the local franchising authority should, but
the proper manner of doing so is less than clear.
On the second point, Federal law not directly related to

cable franchising can cause equally difficult questions.

Con-

sider, for instance, the recent controversy involving the City
of Boulder, Colorado, and Corrmunity Corrrrn.mications Company, Inc.
(CCC),97 concerning primarily the impact of the Sherman .Antitrust
Act on subdistricting.

C.C.C. held a nonexclusive pennit to use

the rights of way of the City of Boulder for cable television
facilities and to operate in one part of the city a reception
improvement system, and the City had detennined that it wished
to receive bids for one or m:>re state-of-the-art systems to
cover the entire jurisdiction.

In order to maintain the status

quo, the City restricted C.C.C. from accepting new customers
during a three m:>nth period during which other potential bidders
could minimize C. C. C. 's competitive advantage.

The company

challenged the restraint as violative of Federal antitrust law.
Mtmicipal corporations are no longer deemed to be im:nune
from· the Sherman Act, after the United States Supreme Court
97see 485 F.Supp. 1035 (D. Colo. 1980); 630 F.2d 704
(10th Girt. 1980); 496 F.Supp. 823 (1980); and Cable Television
Reports, May 1980, pp. 1-3.
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decision in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power·and Light Co.98
Instead, they, l.rrllike sovere,ign states, enjoy such imnunity only
l.rrlder the following circumstances:
1.

the challenged restraint rrust be one clearly articulated

and affirmatively exf)ressed as state policy; and
2.

the regulation rrust be actively supervised by the

state itself. 99
Also of importance is whether the local government has a proprietary,
as opposed to governmental, interest in the regulation.100 In
detennining the specific mandate by the sovereign state, a
pennissive statute may not be sufficient; a mandatory system of
regulation may be required,101 which brings into question the
aroolfilt of actual authority granted by the limited, and permissive,
§

15.1-23.1.

'Ill.is is especially

true i f

any Virginia local

government should take on the proprietary interest of public
ownership, even ignoring any implications of the Dillon Rule.
It also raises to a lesser degree, given lack of proprietary
interest, the question of the authority of Virginia local government to deny additional franchises during the tenn of the original
98u. s·. Sup. Ct. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434, aff 1 d., 435 U.S. 389, 98 S.Ct. 1123
(1978).
99california Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Mi.deal
Aluminum, Inc., 100 S.Ct. 937, 943, 63 L.Ed.2d 233 (1980).
lOOccc v. Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 708 (1980).
101Anthony F. Troy, "Exenption from Federal Antitrust Laws
for Activities of Municipalalities: City of Lafayette and Beyond,"
Fredericksburg, Va., 8 April 1980 (Mim=ographed).
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grant in those few situations where competition might be
economically feasible, even j_f such denial was based on the
perhaps tmjustifiable fear of an action in contract by the
original franchisee.
A restraining order was granted by the U.S. District
Court for Colorado, barring enforcement of the restriction, but
this was overturned at the Circuit Court level.

A pennanent

restriction of C.C.C. to one area of the City imposed afterwards,
however, was also.challenged, thereby bringing into serious
question the authority of local government to set subdistrict
franchise area botmdaries, and the challenge was sustained by
the District Court on July 22, 1980.

In the second decision,

the district court held that the degree of regulation required
to give Boulder antitrust imnunity in such a situation was so
high as both to constitute an excessive infringement of First
Amendment rights, and to cause the regulation to be lowered in
status to a proprietary activity.

The Court questioned whether,

if diversity of prograrrming was the objective, the regulatory
scheme employed was the least restrictive neans substantially
capable of achieving it; assuming that diversity of programning
was even a legitimate local governmental interest.

The court

also noted in analyzing this question, a fear of the control of
the use of public rights of way to obtain control of program
content.102 Another issue which was not reached concerned the
nature of any property right involved with a revocable permit (a.
question also of importance with franchises in the nature of
102496 F.Supp. 823, 828-829.
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contract), which may be revoked without cause, but not for
illegally anticompetitive calise without a showing of a valid
governmental purpose; especially when the property right has
been "enhanced by the First Arnendrrent." Am:mg other such
questions were claims based on equal protection and inverse
condemnation principles.103
Clearly, this case stands as a prime example of the need
for clear and sophisticated state mandates for local governmental
regulation of cable television; for realization of the validity
of the Cable Television Infonnation Center position that threatened
competition against an operating system is highly likely to have
a litigious result rarely worth the trouble; for the consequent
realization that franchises once granted are for practical
reasons often pennanent; and for the great need for careful
planning by local authorities, from the beginning of the cable
experience, for clear and flexible authority to regulate into
the distant future.

The need for such standards being apparent, it remains to
suggest the type of response required of Virginia tp Ireet such
needs.

In several ways, Virginia law hampers effective local

regulation.

Strict application of the Dillon Rule leaves

authority at the state level, at which it is not used to any
appreciable degree.

Neither the legislature nor the Public

Telecorrmmications Board has placed high priority on establishing
103Ibid.' p. 830.
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general teclmical and financial standards, or tmdel ordinance
provisions for effective

~ling

of such matters as citizen

complaints or providing for flexible response to tecl:m.ological
developments.

This absence of standards continues despite

potentially damaging uneven performance on the part of local
goverrnnents.

Additionally, a number of legal questions remain

unanswered, creating an environment in which the threat of
vexatious litigation can hamper local initiative.

It remains,

for instance, unclear in which situations the rredium should be
taken to be a m:mopoly and utility, and when State Corporation
Corrmission regulation would therefore be appropriate.

Also unclear

is the related question of when the public interest in the rredium,
beyond the use of public property, is sufficient to justify
substantial local regulation or public ownership.

State policy,

whether established by statute or otherwise, fails to offer
clear direction as to what role local goverrnrent is charged with
perfonning, leaving that role vulnerable to such potential
pitfalls as antitrust violations.

This says nothing, of course,

of the situations, such as interconnection, in which local
authority is specifically limited, or the limitations imposed by
reliance on general franchising authority.

With the exception

of tmre certain options offered, but not extensively used, by
other types of authority such as zoning, the localities must
rely· on franchises or resort to certification or licensing.

The

latter process offers rrore flexibility, but as might be expected

57

as a result, less certainty of authority or direction.

Generally,

for these reasons, it must be concluded that the limited and
questionable nature of local authority to regulate cable television in Virginia in the public interest is not conducive to
effective local initiative.

CHAPTER.·3

OWNERSHIP OPTIONS - THE EXPERIENCE IN RICHMJND
A city must recognize the need for corrmunications
planning to be able to enter franchise hearings with its
ov.m. clear requirements rather than rrerely respond to
company proposals . . . Only when local governments
charter studies, survey needs, and acquaint themselves
with CKN sufficiently to allow reasoned decisions about
what operation best meets both ~diate and long-tenn
c0Ill1llnity needs will the ad~antages of rrn.micipal ownership be illuminated . . . . 04

As has already been seen the local control objectives of
the Richm:md City Cmm.cil and Administration as evidenced during
its franchise process, especially the planning stage, in granting
a franchise to Continental Cablevision of Richrrond, Inc. , were
minimal.

The purpose here is two-fold: to delineate the alter-

natives open under current Virginia law or with General Assembly
action which might reasonably be proposed; and to critically
compare those objectives with those which the literature and
general experience raise.

To do so will be to point out the

extent to which the process in Virginia, both an legal and
political points, substantially fails to address the question of
the public need.

Fairfax County, as a m:i.tter of fact, offers

the only clear example to the contrary in this study.
lO~ornas R. Leavens, "Conmunity Antenna Television: The
Case for Mtmicipal Control," 22 Wayne Law Review 99-136, November
1975' p. 131.
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Ownership Alternatives
Once the goventlng body has set its objectives, the
observer might look for an examination of at least the following
ownership alternatives:

nn.micipal ownership, public corporation

or authority, coom:m carrier status, and private ownership,
either by the industry or local groups; with a number of potential
policy decisions as to each alternative.

'Ihe record indicates

that only one alternative, from the last category, was ever
seriously considered by the Richrrond Council and Administration.
An outline of the issues which might have been addressed in a

more extensive plarming phase, and some of the advantages and
disadvantages inherent in the various alternatives, follows:
Mlnlicipal or Public Authority Ownership
Mlnlicipal ownership offers the advantages of increased
public access opportunities, even if unprofitable or legally
prohibited under private franchise operations, unilateral
subsidy of public access, lower subscriber fees than a private
system could justify, an increase in channel capacity for increased public access when demanded, or facility developIIEilt to
encourage public access as a public purpose.105
'Ihere is also less likelihood for censorship or the
"chilling effect" of the profit rrotive IIEiltioned earlier if the
system is operated as a public service.

Municipal ownership

could conceivably even engender a constitutional right to access
not present in the broadcast situation.
105Ibid.' pp. 116-117.
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This alternative would require, however, protection
against abuses of govennrental authority which would diminish
the effect of decreased censorship.

For instance, statutory

prohibitions against the use of rrn..micipal funds for official
programnimg, or against use of officials' names or likenesses,
might be advisable.

The potential for enforcement of such

restrictions would be sorrewhat diminished, since it nost likely
would be in the hands of local prosecutors, although traditionally such conflicts have not presented the problem in Virginia
that they have in some other states. 106 There is also danger in
the fact that direct rrn..micipal ownership would give access to
infonnation which could be collected through the cable system to
those IIX)St able and likely to use it in a manner violative of
individual privacy.

Private ownership, however, would not

necessarily solve this potential problem.
. . . the potential for abuse is not ended by
private ownership. Private owners m:i.y also be interested
in collecting infonnation either to use themselves or to
pass on or sell to others; the operator might assent to
public or private taps. The real problem is not ownership, but rather CATV' s pervasive potential for invasion
of privacy and unauthorized use of infonnation.107
On both of these obstacles to rrn..micipal ownership, the "independent"

public authority has been recomnended by some as a remedy.108
Other factors which would affect the operation of a
IIR.IIlicipally owned system in a unique way, but about the impact
of which there is considerable question, include
106rbid., p. 120.
107Ibid.' pp. 134-135.
108Ibid.

61
--the economic impact of shopping by cable on both private
and public investment in shopping centers and downtown areas ;
--the effect of polling or voting by cable on the political
system;
--the impact of availability of data and services by
cable on the necessity for physical proximity to the central
city; and
--the risk of public funds on a technological developm2Ilt
which potentially could become obsolete. 109
Beyond direct public funding, two financial advantages of IID.lilicipal
or authority ownership would be decreased operated expenses
through ta"'{ exemptions, and the availability of development
capital through general obligation or revenue bonds.110
There is considerable question under the Dillon Rule, as
to whether or not the City of Richmond could have entered into
such an enterprise without specific authorization by the General
Assembly, since it would be difficult to make a necessary implication of ownership from express authority.

Such authorization,

of course, could have meant delay, but delay in the long tenn
public interest might be a positive choice.

Any request for

authorization to operate a cable system as a proprietery function
would also have been less than certain, however, since the
"public purpose" question raised above remains unsettled, and
since operation of inform:i.tion systems has not been a traditional
109Ibid., p. 130.
llOibid., p. 127.
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function of limited local governm?nt in Virginia.

This is, of

course, especially true of enterprises so easily tied philosophically to the private sector by the potential for substantial
profit.
The extent to which this alternative has been considered
by the Virginia localities examined is questionable.

The RichmJnd

City Manager's Office apparently examined only one such system,
which eventually went to private ownership. 111 In point of
fact, as of 1977, there were approximately twenty cities in the
United States with pUblic owned cable television services.112
While the Manager's objection that local control or ownership is
meaningless due to the operational necessity for industry expertise
is a potential problem, it is not necessarily an insurmJuntable
one.113
Connx:m Carrier Status
In this alternative, the cable system operator would be

prohibited from any control of prograrrming, but instead would
lease channels on a non-discriminatory basis.

Such an approach

would have the advantage of encling any justification for government control of content based ori. concentration of program control,114
lllrnterview, Allen, Richrrond, Va., 12 December 1979.
112Robert E. Jacobson, Mi.Jnici)al Control of Cable Corrmunications
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977 , p. 5; for validity of mmicipal ownership in Frankfort, Kentucky, see Consolidated TV Cable
Service v. Frankfort, 465 F.2d 1190 (1972).
113rnterview, Allen; and Leavens, p. 131.
114Bruce M. Owen, "Cable Television: The FraireWork of
Regulation." in U.S. Congress, Ser;ate C~ttee on Governmental
Affairs, Study of Federal Regulation, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Govt. Printing Office, 1978, p. 359.
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and would generally encourage diversity in the sense envisioned
by traditional antitrust pripciples.

Three recent major studies

\

of cable television [the Cabinet Corrrnittee Report (1974), the
Corrmittee for Economic Development Report (1975), and the Staff
Report of the House Subcorrrnittee on Corrmunications · (1976)], have
recorrmended this alternative to varying degrees.115
Among objections, primarily from industry, is the possibility

that comnon carrier status would el:i.m:inate the only potential
investors willing to develop local prograrrrning while penetration
of a cable system in a particular market is growing, or that it
could result in rate-of-return regulation in the manner of
public utilities, which might be unnecessary for the foreseeable
future due to competition from other rredia.116
Private Ownership-Comrnm.ity Organization Ownership
While the Riclnnond organizational arrangement is of this
category, there are a number of variations which could have
been, but apparently were not, seriously considered, as follows:
1)

ownership by "enterprises which have

COIIE

into being

within neighborhoods that have special social or ethnic problems
and constitute in some rreasure sub-cities with special requirements and special knowledge of their own;ll7
2)

as implied by the public ownership alternative,

state-mandated regional franchising authorities, perhaps at the
SMSA·level, which could grant several franchises in a market,
ll5Ibid., p. 373.
116Ibid.' pp. 377, 374.
ll7s1oan, Television of AblIDdance, p. 162.
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with boundaries following derrographic standards rather political
boundaries.

This could also. allow for networking to meet sub-

area needs; 118
3)

cross-ownership with local m=dia; this could well

have required delay of an award until after Federal deregulation,
since the cross-ownership controversy is one of long-standing in
the broadcast field, and since cross-ownership of cable systems
could result in a disproportinate increase in the influence of
one particular media voice in a cornnunity.

It might also be

profitable for a franchiser under such an arrangement to stifle
cable growth.

It would, however, offer skill and talent resources,

interest in the local corrrnunity, and a source of start-up capital,
and could potentially encourage m=dia diversity by enabling
locally owned newspapers to remain economically viable through
control of, and profit through, this new medium, which otherwise
might be threatening. 119 The Leesburg situation ma.y eventually
to be illustrative of this.
4)

financing, especially if the franchisee is an association

or joint venture at the local level, gives rise to a number of
possibilities, such as
--investment by local banks, church groups, insurance
companies, savings and loan associations, private investors
concerned with local development, or industrial concerns;
118Ibid., pp. 149, 152, 159-160, 162, 177; and Jack Whitley,
"Cable Television: The Practical Implications of Local Regulation
and Control," 27 Drake law Review (1977-78): 391-420, 403-404.
119sloan, Television of Abundance, pp. 137-139.
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--public investment by corrmunity development programs;
--"turn-key" constrl!ction of the system by the cable
industry, with control gradually turned over to a local company
or venture;
--mtmicipal construction of the system, with bids being
taken instead for operating and rnanagerrent.120
Financing is an especially important consideration in urban
areas where reception is not an issue, so much as is full service
from the beginning of the operation.121
Among the advantages often cited for private cable industry
ownership are that the availability of local services is econornically dependent upon the existence of a viable, profitable
national marketplace. 122 Additionally, an argument for either
nrunicipal or industry control instead of corrmunity based ventures
is the fact that corrmunity based systems are seen as economically
impractical tm.less backed by political and financial entrepreneurs
tm.reflective of the corrmunity,123 and even this self-defeating
financial backing might be unlikely considering the lack of
effective recourse in the event of default.124
120r..eavens, p. 126; and Tate, pp. 31-32.
121Leavens, p. 125.
122Robert W. Hughes, statem=nt before the Subcomnittee on
Corrmunications, in U.S. Congress, House Comnittee on Interstate and
Foreign CoIIIIErce, Volurre I, 'Ille Corrmunications Act of 1978, Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1979, p. 485.
123Jacobson, p. 101.
124Leavens, p. 125.
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While the potential cost to the City of Richrrond or the
delay necessary in obtaining, legislative authorization could
have been reasons for giving little consideration to encouragement of a corrm..mity venture as franchisee, delay in developing a
system in which the public interest might have been nore fully
protected could have been a wiser course.

In light of the

potential social and political implications of a cable system,
the issue of cost could have been nore fully addressed from the
standpoint of what one comrentator has called "advocacy economics,"
by inquiring as to the public cost of not developing the system
as a public or quasi-public one.125

As have been noted above, the Ricbrnonu v.1..Ly vuuuc.1...L

created public confusion as to its ownership objectives by
allowing the agenda of the franchising process to be set solely
by potential franchisees and an Administration concerned primarily with technical and financial considerations.

In fact,

this may also have evidenced confusion or lack of knowledge on
the part of Council as to the potential issues to be addressed.
Ironically, they reached a decision which was justifiable, not
on the basis of that agenda, but for largely unstated and
limited concerns over local control.

Beyond this, however,

Council allowed even its consideration of local control to be
limited to response to industry proposals.

As might have been

expected, those proposals concerned only the control of public
access, and the granting of relatively m=aningless local ownership.
125Jacobson, p. 103.
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The latter proposal was, of course, for the purpose of affecting
the franchise process by economic windfall for local corrmunity
leaders more than for increasing local control.

It has been the

purpose here to raise from the literature a few of the ownership
alternatives which could have been considered in a riore fully
developed planning process.

Clearly, a sophisticated procedure

for initiation of service by this new medium would include a
more careful analysis of the ownership and control alternatives
and their irrpact on the public interest of each particular
corrmunity.

To say this is not necessarily to indict Richmond's

handling of the issue.
level as well.

Much remains to be done at the state

Several of the alternatives suggested above are

not available to localities under current law.

Some, even if

available, would be unattractive given other legislative lapses,
as on the issue of privacy protection, which should in any event
be addressed.
If the current prognos.tications concerning the impact of
cable are accurate to any significant degree, the importance of
these issues cannot be underestimated .
. The time for action is now: a radical change in
the structure . . . of the city and its node of operations
may be possible for only a short while longer.126
Perhaps, on the other hand, interest in corrmunity involvement
will dim:insh after a short operation of basic cable service,
thereby ending the demand or the need for public use which is
now seen by the industry as merely "interference. 11127 Perhaps,
126Ib"d
1. • ' p. 9 .
127Leavens, pp. 133-134.
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given this uncertain future and legal and political framework,
public interest consideratiop.s at this stage make Virginia local
franchises tmWise.

This is especially

true

since a grant of a

public franchise can bind the city to its choices for m:iny
years, particularly considering contract implications, and since
resistance of renewal can be economically and politically
difficult.128
The purpose here, however, is not only to raise these
issues, but analyze their potential impact on the nature of
cable in the Virginia environment.

One of the above organi-

zational alternatives with particular relevance to that point is
that of regional networking.

128Leavens, p. 136; and 'Whitley, p. 417.

CHAPTER 4·

REGIONAL NETWORKING - A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE
Special purpose districts have been generally defined as

"

that fonn of political corporation which has a continuing

but indefinite existence, independent of other fonns of local
goverrnrent, with limited geographical scope, and limited purposes. 11129
Such districts offer an effective and efficient neans of providing
or regulating regional services with centralized planning, and
without annexation or burdening any one jurisdiction.130
Similarly, if that regional service is provided by a private
proprietor, it is spared the effects of operating under several
different local regulatory authorities.

They are especially

functional with those services, such as cable television, in
which there is a potential for a high degree of participation by
system users in decisions concerning service and for staff
expertise.

This is true since such situations offer inherent

programning, ethical, and professional standards, and control
against unfair limitation of services or bureaucratic stiffling
of user participation in system decisionmaking.

The possibility

of the development of expertise on governing boards is also
increased.

Flexibility of service areas is provided when

129John E. Juergensrneyer, "Special Purpose Taxation Districts:
Corning or Going?" University of Richmond Law Review (Fall 1976): 87,
90, 98.
130Ibid.
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jurisdictional b01.mdaries themselves are irrelevant to service
objectives.

This is especia,lly true when rural areas rrust also

be served, since this is possible with a relatively lower overall
cost to the taxpayer.

Under certain technological limitations,

this IIE.y, in fact, be the only feasible IIEniler of serving rural
areas.

Generally, the effects of interjurisdictional disputes

are diminished, and the coordination of services of divided or
sIIE.11 corrm.mities, as well as their general tm.ity, are encouraged.131
Against that background, it is readily apparent that the approach
to cable television franchising taken in Virginia has not been
statewide or regional, either in policy or practice, but rather
has been limited within jurisdictional boundaries unrelated and
historically irrelevant to a twentieth century technology, or to
the technological rquirements of, or the conrnunity resources
made available by, the rrediurn.

In addition to any disadvantages

of the special district rrechanism that would be the vehicle for
a regional approach, it is likely that the historical and political chauvinism of Virginia localities are also to blame.
Nonetheless, franchising within regions can result in
several improvements in the quality of cable service.

Inter-

connections between subdistricts within the franchise, or
between sIIE.11 franchises within a region, can allow public
access and corrm...mity prograrrming at the neighborhood level
targeted for areas of similar ethnic, cultural, or economic
characteristics, whether or not they are physically adjacent, or
131Ibid.' pp. 89, 90, 96.
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related to jurisdictional botm.daries.132 Obviously, such an
arrangement would increase the number of viewers for the entire
network, as opposed to the audience of individual systems in
each jurisdiction, thereby allowing the high costs of specialized
prograrrming to be spread over a larger number of subscribers.
This is especially i.rrportant since the proportion of homes
actually reached by cable relative to the broadcast m:=dia must
be expected to remain low for some time.133 As m=ntioned above,
a regional network of subsystems also could help to mitigate the
problem of cross-subsidization for areas, such as rural conmunities,
where the system would otherwise lack feasibility, a practice
which worked well in the electrical and telephone industries
with their relatively lower capital costs.

The fact that such

costs make this tm.likely with cable at this tine will also be
lessened as technology develops and once the front end capital
expenditures of particular systems have been covered.134 For
instance, it would have been much rrore efficient and economically
feasible to plan and i.rrplement system growth in a regional
arrangem:=nt in the Ricbm:md area to rural areas as population
density changes drastically over the next fifteen years.

This

is especially important when it is realized that a certain
am:>tm.t of rural subsidization is required to serve isolated
cormn.mities which are derrographically attractive, such as Brandermill
132Baer, pp. 33-36.
133Leland L. Johnson, "The Social Effects of Cable Television,"
San Francisco, Cal., 1975 (Mim:=ographed), pp. 4, 7-8; and Baer, p. 186.
136..~Noll, p. 197.
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in Chesterfield Cotmty.

This is also true of areas that are of

political necessity for govep:ring body members from rural
areas, and therefore ITn.lSt be served, but which are economically
or technically unfeasible, such as M"atoaca and Ettrick in the
same cOLmty.

There probably is no better example of the extent

to which regional cooperation could increase system feasibility
than the fact that the inclusion of the City of Colonial Heights
could substantially improve the economic factors involved in
this very expensive capital project of extending service to the
Petersburg area from Riclmmd. 135 Also, there is within such a
system no technological justification for concentrated ownership,
thereby allowing fragmented ownership as a viable objective
which addresses social and economic issues.

This may be true,

for instance, in those m:Jllopoly situations which can present
antitrust problems, it being sorrewhat easier to avoid those
problems 'When many subdistrict franchises are being granted than
when there is only one for the entire service area.

Such frag-

mentation would also allow rrore objective manipulation of system
size and comparison of system perfonnance.136 The benefits of
networking, however, should not be expected to be readily apparent.
For instance, the large system which such a network would tmite
only could encourage local prograrrming in a syrribiotic manner.
Local prograrrming will only be attractive to operators 'When
there is a large viewer coverage, which, except for a few large
135rnterview, Micas.
136Babe, p. 56.
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cities, is unlikely to develop without networking.

Networking

of existing adjacent systems separately owned will be achieved,
however, only upon proof of enough potential profit to warrant
the difficult process of achieving cost sharing and technological agreements. 137 The profit situation, however, is
clouded, since any economy of scale for local progranming would
be highly sensitive to fractionalization if reduced to the
neighborhood level,138 wtiich is an opportunity networking would
not only provide, but would for social and political reasons
encourage.
Cable system feasibility is not a simple issue to analyze.
System size is frequently a relatively unimportant consideration,
as is evidenced by the.operation of two separate systems under
three franchises in the relatively underpopulated Tricities
area.

It must be kept in mind that cable television suffers

from certain diseconomies of scale by its very nature.

The

optimal system would probably serve one hundred thousand subscribers with seventy miles of cable, which would only result
from a highly unlikely density.139

Small systems are actually

137Johnson, p. 8.
138Noll, p. 200.
139Babe, p. 37 ; quoting Leonard Good, "An Econometric Model
of the Canadian Cable Television Industry and the Effects of CRTC
Regulation (Ph.D. thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1974), pp.
60-74.
The age of these statistics might undennine their
current accuracy. Technological advances, resulting in
both lower capital. costs, but also in higher system cost
due to added services, could have affected sorrewhat the
feasibility of small systems either way in the last six
years.
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more efficient in many circumstances than large, but a mininn.lm
size of one hmdred, fifty ro two htmdred miles of plant, or
given the typical situation, approximately forty thousand
potential subscribers, is usually required. l40 Miles of plant
is actually the best measure of system size, since it eliminates
the population density variable, but there a number of other
factors which must be considered.
1.

For instance:

fixed investment per mile increases as the number of

miles increases;
2.

fixed investment per household falls off sharply as

systems grow to approximately thirty thousand subscribers, but
then becomes constant;

3.

fixed investment per potential subscriber declines

rapidly as population density rises mtil arotmd one hmdred,
fifty households per mile;
4.

in order to obtain the lowest possible investment per

subscriber, a pentetration rate of over fifty percent of households passed is required; and

5.

operating costs, excluding depreciation, fall as

system size approaches two hmdred miles, but if depreciation is
included, and tmeconomically small plants (those mder forty
miles) are excluded, operating costs actually rise as system
size increases. 141
140Babe, pp. 56, 27.
141Ibid.' pp. 27, 36-37.
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While such economic analysis for Virginia systems is
beyond the scope of this pap.er, it can be said that, while the
issue of system size cannot be used to justify large regional
systems, it certainly cannot automatically be used to discount
the viability of small subdistricts.
addresses economic considerations.

This, of course, only
It says nothing of the

social benefits to be gained.
While population density is not usually the best indicator
of potential system or subsystem feasibility, there is evidence
that, pending forseeable technological developments, rnininrum
efficient size is approximately three hundred, fifty homes per
square mile.142

Interestingly, the Tricities area jurisdictions,

which might be suspected of being potentially the least feasible,
individually or as subsystems, have the following number of
households per square mile:
Petersburg

645

Hopewell

782

Colonial Heights

741

Prince George

29

Dinwiddie

14

The three cities are considerably above the suggested
minimal limit; and when it is considered that system expansion
into the colITlties would be limited to suburban areas, as has
been done by franchise in Prince George recently, it is apparent
that this area theoretically could support several systems or
l42Allenby, pp. 43-44.
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subsysterns.143 In a similar situation in Northern Virginia, the
Cable Television Infonnation. Center has found Falls Church with
a population of approximately twenty thousand to be suitable for
a separate systern.144
In technical tenns, the regional approach is possible.145
"While service quality dinTinishes with distance from the headend,
so does that of all competing broadcast media.

Long distance

cable transmission is possible either through microwave transmission, as in Chesterfield, or through "supertnmk" systems,
which are specially designed for low frequency use to minimize
signal loss over long distances which are impractical in main
systems due to the need for expensive frequency conversion
equipment for subscriber use, to ''hubs" in distant corrmunities. 146
Satellite connection of large regional or national networks is
even possible.147 Additionally, the use of cascades of fifty or
more recently developed amplifiers can minimize noise and distortion over regional metropolitan distances.

With such currently

available technology, system runs of twenty to twenty-five miles
are possible with enough remairiing signal strength to feed a
regular cable distribution system. 148
143rnterview, Martha Burton, Petersburg, Va., 15 December 1980.
144william F. Roeder, Jr. , to C. Edward Roettger, Jr. , 14
November 1980.
145Baer, p. 188.
146cunningham, pp. 211, 227, 241; and Johnson, pp. 7-8.
147Johnson, p. 8.

148cunn.ingham, pp. 11, 242.
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While density of population has been frequently cited as a
determining factor in Virginia system feasibility, this is not,
•

as has been seen, necessarily the case.
variable according to rrost analysts.

Penetration is the key

Fixed costs and those

related to the number of system miles account for approximately
three-fourths of capital cost and imre for operation.

The cost

of adding additional subscribers is relatively small. Use of
penetration as a determinant changes the feasibility focus
primarily to difficult market analysis of the impact of various
services on consumer uses. 149
The Chesterfield and Fairfax County experiences offer
evidence of this point.

At the beginning, administrators felt

that the jurisdictions' population densities were too low to
support state-of-the-art systems, but proceeded only because of
the fear of political repercussions should other area localities
offer a service '\Nhich they could not.

In the Fairfax situation,

technological developm2Ilts making additional services feasible
have mitigated the problem, as is evidenced by a large number of
very interested potential operators.

In Chesterfield, a franchise

area including approximately ninety-five percent of the county's
households is expected to operate effectively, with a penetration
rate to this point of over eighty percent, as compared to a
national average of approximately fifty percent.

In both cases,

the derrographic characteristics of these basically middle class
l49Noll, p. 153.
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corrm.mities, with a population economically capable of using
cable service and constituting an attractive market, but not
having access to the broader range of entertainment services
available in wealthier corrmunities, were probably determative. 150
It is interesting that subdistricting would enable nore
flexible manipulation of service to rreet such derIDgraphic considerations.

More importantly, hOW"ever, it is apparent that the

often stated concern about regional systems, that being that
economically tmjustifiable sparsely populated areas would have
to be served, is also of questionable relevance.

Since localities in Virginia are "creatures of the state,"
it is incumbent on the State to provide the statutory authority
for regional cooperation.

Again, a situation exists in which

the legal framework presents nore of an opporttmity then has
been taken, but less than is necessary, apparently, to encourage,
much less require, such an approach.
Article VII, §§ 2 and 3 .of the Virginia Constitution
provides:
The General Assembly shall provide by general law
for the organization, government, pOW'ers, change of
b0tmdaries, consolidation, and dissolution of counties,
cities, towns, and regional governments . . . .
The General Assembly may also provide by special
act for the organization, government, and pOW'ers of any
cotmty, city, town, or regional government, including
such pOW'ers of legislation, taxation, and assessment as
150rnterview, Micas; Interview, Golden; and Washington
Post, 27 December 1979, sec. Va., p. 3.
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the General Assembly may detennine, but no such special
act shall be adopted which provides for the extension or
contraction of botmdc\,ries of any cotmty, city, or town.
Every law providing for the organization of a
regional government shall, in addition to any other
requirements imposed by the General Assembly, require the
approval of the organization of the regional government
by a majority vote of the qualified voters voting thereon
in each cotmty and city which is to participate in the
regional government and of the voters voting thereon in a
part of a cotmty or city where only the part is to participate.
The General Assembly may provide by general law or
special act that any cotmty, city, town, or other tmit of
government may exercise any of its powers or perfonn any
of its functions and may participate in the financing
thereof jointly or in cooperation with the Conrnonwealth
or any other tmit of governrrent within or without the
Conmmwealth. The General Assembly may provide by general
law or special act for transfer to or sharing with a
regional goverrnnent of any services, functions, and
related facilities of any cotmty, city, town, or other
tmit or government within the botmdaries of such regional
government.
Thus, the General Assembly may provide for regional government
subject to the referendum requirement, which has been am:mg the
many factors discouraging such action by localities to this
point.

It might be conjectured that cable television would

present such an attractive service to the electorate that it
would constitute one of the few situations in which use of the
regional government approach might be politically realistic.
This is tmlikely for a number of reasons, annng them the General
Assembly's response to Article VII, § 2.

Article 3, Chapter 34,

Title 15.1 of the Code of Virginia, the Virginia Area Development Act, requires not only the concurrence of the majority of
those voting within each jurisdiction, 151 but also limits
15lva. Code § 15.1-1420.
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participation unnecessarily, and inappropriately for cable
purposes, within Planning Di,stricts; and requires that a majority
of the population in the District be included. 152 't-bre damaging,
however, is Va. Code § 15.1-1422 (b), which states:
The plan shall assure that the services to be
initially provided by the service district shall be of
sufficient number and importance to produce a meaningful
goverrnnental unit and program and shall provide the
framework of goverrnnent for the eventual performance by
the service district of all of the functions and services
which are appropriate for perfonnance on a district-wide
basis.
This not only leaves open, but also encourages, consolidation of
a wide range of local services once any one service, such as
cable, has been established on a regional basis, thereby undermining the political viability of any such plan.

Of course,

this provision could be amended, and, since total consolidation
of jurisdictions is provided for elsewhere in the Code, one IIll.lSt
question the necessity for regional goverrnnent provisions being
so similar in ult:llnate result.153 Fortunately, a nuch older
approach, also provided for in the Constitution, is possible.
Va. Code§ 15.1-21 (a) provides that
[a]ny power or powers, privileges or authority
exercised or capable of exercise by any political subdivision of this State may be exercised . . . jointly
with any political subdivision of this State and, with
any political subdivision of another State.
This raises several possibilities.

As an aside, the last provision

of the subsection leaves to Northern Virginia the possibility of
152va. Code § 15.1-1421.
153see, for instance, Va. Code§§ 15.1-1071 to 1083,
15.1-1130 to 1148.
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participating in a Washington area network about which there is
currently sorre speculation.154 'M:>re importantly though, perhaps
•
localities could delegate their franchising authority in a
regional mutual-exercise-of-powers agreement. Dillon's Rule does
not prohibit the delegation of local authority.155 The authority
to do so is of some question, however, since there is specific
Constitutional restriction on the exercise of the franchising
authority by cities and towns, and Va. Code § 15.1-21 (b) would
probably require each jurisdiction to take the "appropriate
action." The doubt raised concerning joint franchising would
probably be enough to prohibit such action under the Dillon
Rule.

This probably would not preclude, however, adjacent

jurisdictions from reaching the sane franchise decision and then
providing for joint regulation pursuant to Va. Code § 15.1-21
(c) (2).

Thus, State law offers regional alternatives, but certainly
does not offer any of such specific relevance to the cable
situation as to encourage it.

There are some legal situatons,

however, which do offer such encouragement.

Before any county,

for instance, can reach a cable franchise agreement, it must
come to some agreement with other franchising authorities within
the Comty.

For instance, the Town of Vierma claimed the authority

to grant franchises within the town prior to comty action at
one point in the Fairfax process. 156 Were the situation as
154Interview, Jacks and Evans.
1551974 Rep. Att'y. Gen. 103.
156washington Post, 10 July 1979, sec. C, p. 3.
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complex in any Virginia localities as in those in sorre other
states, the state might be f9rced into mJre aggressively regulating franchising generally and service areas specifically. 157
Prince George's County, Maryland,with its twenty-eight municipalities, at least one of which has attempted to affect the
course of county-wide cable television by granting a separate
franchise of questionable feasibility, offers a good example.
This situation could be reversed by the State and used to
require that local franchises receive State approval, as to any
number of requirements, but specifically as to service area,
before such franchises becorre operative.
Legal and practical alternatives for regional organization
do not guarantee, however, that such an approach is politically
viable.

The history of special districts in Virginia offers a

subject area on which the General Assembly has been particularly
reluctant to depart from ''known patterns.'' As urban problems
have grown beyond city boundaries in Virginia, especially since
World War II, increased interest in regional approaches has
developed.

The General Assembly has provided by special act for

the joint exercise of local authority by special districts, and
local goverrunents have also participated in such arrangements
under general law.158 The objectives and results have not
always been encouraging, however.

One of the primary purposes

157washington Post, 10 January 1980, sec. Md., p. 1.
158Howard, pp. 791, 823, 865.
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has been to circtnTIVent constitutional limitations on local debt,
for instance, through local service contracts with authorities.
The Virginia Supreme Court has held that such contracts do not
constitute a present local debt in the full anot.mt when they are
for the perfonnance of an essential public service, which cable
at this point almost certainly is not; and when payment is in
instalbn?nts made as service is rendered.159

It is also

true

that special districts were even authorized during the control
of state government by the Byrd organization, but only as an
effort to

~et

the demands of local governments for services for

which the state was unwilling to incur debt or to have the
localities do so directly.

It can be seen then, that in creating

special districts, the usual fiscal advantages have been offset
by the fact that debts of the authorities have not been backed
by the credit of the state, thereby subjecting bonds issued to
higher interest rates. 160 In a capital intensive service such
as cable, financing considerations such as this can be crucial
to initial feasibility, as h8.s been discussed above.

It should

also be noted that special districts in Virginia have been
created for the m:>st part for perfonnance of functions traditionally recognized as having a legitima.te public purpose, and
with cable that status has not been obtained.
Of further mitigation, in the Virginia setting, of the
advantages of special district cable franchising or operation
is the lack of independence from general purpose local government
159 Tuid. ' pp. 865-866.
16C\Jilkinson, pp. 191-192; and Howard, p. 865.
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that any district would enjoy.

For instance, the General

Asserribly has specifically declined to authorize taxation by
special districts, despite a Metropolitan Areas Study Corrmission
recormendation in favor of such an approach.

Instead, districts

may only assess general purpose local governrnents. 161 In this
way, one of the direct links of responsibility between cable
system users and management is lost.

A further potential road-

block to the use of special districts in the Virginia cable
experience is the often stated claim that their creation leads
to fragmentation of governrnent. 162 It should be noted, however,
that as this applies to cable regulation, and franchising
generally, this criticism depends upon the perspective one
takes.

It could just as easily be maintained that the current

constitutional delegation of the franchise authority to cities
and towns fragments an important state governmental function.
In fact, this important issue 'Was debated at the 1901-1902

Constitutional convention, based upon a concern that this delegation of authority could weaken the power of the Corrrmnwealth
to control economic growth and encourage the development of
statewide projects.

This argunent prevailed at least partially,

in that counties were denied general franchising authority. 163
Nonetheless, for many reasons it remains questionable whether or

§

161Juergensrreyer, p. 88; Howard, p. 820; and Va. Code
15.1-1400.
162Howard, p. 865.
163rbid. , pp. 848-850.
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not a regional organizational framework for the operation and
regulation of cable television in Virginia, whether operation is
by the private or the public sector, is politically realistic.
This is true despite the fact that such districts would be IDJre
politically viable than regional government, which interferes to
a greater extent with the functional and territorial integrity
of traditional local jurisdictions. 164

Virginia need not take an innovative approach in order to
impose a statewide framework and policy on cable television
franchising.

Eleven states have :imposed sorre regulatory authority

over cable franchising. Eight do so through their public utility
commission, which, as has been seen, Virginia does not.

Most,

however, do so only in limiting local decisionrnaking, as with
Hawaii, Connecticut, and New Jersey.

At least three states have

independent agencies for regulating the franchise process, for
instance, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York. 165
Such state regulations provide a number of alternatives
for regional approaches.

In Connecticut and Massachusetts,

while state corrrnissioners are given authority to establish
technical stanadards and standard franchise provisions, to
regulate rates, and to require certificates of compliance with
those standards, little authority is given to regulate service
164Juergensrneyer, pp. 97-98.
165navid CMen Korte, 11 Cable Franchising in the Preferred
Approach," Public Managerrent, July 1980, p. 18.
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areas, and the primary franchising authority remains with the
localities.166 Connecticut aoes provide for annual meetings of
regional advisory councils with franchisees though,167 and
Massachusetts at least encourages subdistricting within jurisdictions by defining "area or areas to be served" as including
"a municipality or a portion of a m.micipality in order to
reflect within municipal boundaries, the various economic,
cultural, geographic and cormunity interests of the citizens
residing therein. 168
Other states, however, take an even m::>re aggressive
approach.

In Hawaii, the Director of Regulatory Agencies has

the authority to grant permits for cable television systerns. 169
Applications for such permits must state the service area to be
covered, and "(i]n determining the area which is to be serviced
. . . , the director shall take into account the geography and
topography of.the proposed service area, and both the present
operations and the planned and potential expansion of the
applicant's and other CATV companies.170 The director also has
the duty to promulgate criteria.for the designation of service
l66connecticut Code §§ 16-38 et seq.; and Massachusetts
Code §§ 166~:1 et seq.
167conn. Code § 16-331.
16~ss. Code § 166A:l (f).

169Hawaii Code § 440G-4.
170rbid., §§ 440G-6 and 8 (a)(2).
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areas.171 The State Division of Public Utilities and Carriers
in Rhode Island has similar authority to grant certificates of
compliance and to impose standards as to territory of operation.172

In New Jersey, the State Board of Utility Corrmissioners
may deny a state certificate of approval for either technical or
f:inancial reasons, and, roost importantly for the purpose here,
may direct more or less coverage of service area, if the impact
of the application's approval "WOuld be to impede developmmt of
adequate service or create unreasonable duplication.

Mrnicipal

consent is still required, but ma.y not be arbitrarily withheld.173
New York's Comnission on Cable Television is charged with
the responsibility to "stirmllate and encourage cooperative
arrangerrents am:mg organizations, institutions and rrn.micipalities
in development of regional educational, instructional and public
affairs prograrrrning," a mandate only somewhat broader than that
of the Virginia statute, and also to "cooperate with rrn.micipalities to facilitate multiple corrmunity cable television
systems. 11 174 Franchises must still be granted by municipalities,
and, while they are not valid t.m.til a state certificate of
confirmation is granted, apparently that certificate may not be
denied on the grot.m.ds of service area.17 5 The Cormri.ssion may
later, however, order the interconnection or coordination of
operation of approved systems.176
171Ibid., § 440G-12 (2).
172Rhode Island Code §§ 39-19 3 and 4.
173N.J. § 48:5A-17b; 48-SA-22.
174N.Y. § 815 (7) and (8).
175Ibid., §§ 819 and 821. 176Ibid., § 823.
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Minnesota takes one of the rrost affinnative regional
approaches.

That legislature has fol.Illd that cable corrmuni-

cations is in a state of rapid growth and corporate consolidation and that during that process it should confonn to regional
and statewide service objectives; that area-wide service should
be encouraged, while concentration of ownership is discouraged;
that many local governments lack the expertise and resources to
plan for and secure the benefits of cable systems, or to protect
subscribers and others in franchise negotiations; that there is
a need for a statewide service plan and standard franchise
practices ; and that it IIUJSt be assured that ". . . rrn.micipal
franchising results in camm.mication across

~tropolitan

areas

and in neighborhood corrmunities in larger m.micipalities."177
The Minnesota Cable Comm.mications Board is charged with setting
standards for establishing or altering service areas, is given
the authority to approve special territories on application of
municipalities or cable operators, and may order the interconnection of systems. 178 A regional system in the Twin Cities
area is specifically required by state law. 179 A procedure is
provided for extension of core service areas, including the
joint exercise of powers of m.micipalities in accepting the
earlier franchise of a core service unit in another m.micipality, l80 and allows joint franchising and regulation by
177Minnesota Code § 238.01.
l78Ibid., §§ 238.05 (6) and (7), 238.06 (5).
179Minn. Code§ 238.05 (2)(c).
180Ibid.' § 238.17.
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m.micipalities, each of which v,;ould contribute a council member
and a citizen member to a joint comnission for that purpose. 181

An interesting provision is the fact that
[f]or the purposes of assisting in the :implementation
of sections 238.01 and 238.17, the IIEtropolitan council
and regional development corrrnissions of the state may
engage in a program of research and study concerning
interconnections, cable territories, regional use of
cable cOITilUJilications and all other aspects 'vllich may be
of regional concern.182
Such a mandate could easily be given to planning district corrrnissions
in Virginia.
It should be noted that even in Minnesota, local prerogatives
are not totally abrogated, as municipalities continue to have
the franchising authority.

Franchises must be approved by the

Board before they become effective though.l83

The question of service area and system fragmentation is
not only recognized as fundamentally a part of the franchise
procedure from its inception by other state statutes, but also
in the literature.

Walter S. Baer in Cable Television:

A

Handbook for Decisionmaking, recognizes three related questions
of major importance which should be addressed early in the
process:
1.

geographic coverage;

2.

coordination with neighboring jurisdictions for

efficient service and interconnection; and
181Ibid., § 238.08.
182 rbid., § 238.10.
183Ibid.' § 238.09.
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3.

the question of multiple or single ownership in the

area. Such issues are rrost apequately addressed in conjtmction
with regional planning corrrnissions.184
The experience in the three Virginia areas studied is
quite the contrary.

The provisions of the ordinances reflect

little concern for regional issues.

The record does not in-

dicate that any consideration has been given to regional networking or subdistricting, except for speculation concerning the
distant future, and, in point of fact, the possibility of
operation on a regional basis by MSO's seeking additional
franchises has rrore often than not had negative impact on their
proposal's chances.185
Legislative response to the networking issue, to the
extent it exists, is as follows:
Northern Virginia
Arlington Code § 41-4, offers perhaps the best example,
as follows:
(d) The company may be required to interconnect
its system with any other broadband corrrm.mications facility
operating in an adjacent·territory. Such interconnection
shall be made within sixty (60) days of a request made by
an appropriately designated cotmty agency. The agency
shall have the responsibility of coordinating such interconnections to insure technical compatibility between the
systems to be interconnected. For good cause shown the
company may request and the board may grant reasonable
extensions of time to comply with the requirements.
(e) For the purpose of permitting the simultaneous
transmission into any one or 110re subdistricts of isolated,
discrete signals of cotmty channels, public charmels, and
184Baer, pp. 78-79.
185rnterview, Micas; Interview, Fmrich; and Interview,
Jacks and Evans.
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company channels, the company shall upon request of an
appropriate designated official of the cotm.ty, arrange
the system so that it• is capable of such transmission
to subdistricts, the nurriber and botm.daries of such shall
be as detennined by the board upon reconrnendation of the
agency. The company shall t.mdertake the development of a
plan to divide the cot.mty into the greatest nurriber of
subdistricts practicable, which subdistricts may be
variously combined so as to constitute neighborhood comrrn.mities, school districts, Congressional districts,
State Senate and Assembly districts, and the like, for
the simultaneous transmission into any one or nore of
such subdistricts of such isolated, discrete signals.
Such plan shall be submitted to the cot.mty within a
reasonble time after the request is made. The cotm.ty
shall approve or nodify such plan giving due regard to
economic, technological and engineering considerations.
Such plan shall be implemented and the system be capable
of simultaneous transmission of such isolated signals. .
There are problems with this, however.

Va. Code·§ 15.1-

23.1 raises the issue of cost allocation t.mder (d); and nore
importantly, there are currently no plans for subdistricting and
only speculation about interconnection.

The Alexandria Code, in § 7B-32, offers the following
relatively good language, but again with no plans for implementation, which leads to the suspicion that it is simply
boilerplate.
Interconnection.
A franchisee may interconnect the system with any
or all other cable television systems in the area if
otherwise lawful and provided such other system agrees to
the interconnection. Interconnection of systems may be
done by direct cable connection, microwave link, satellite
or other appropriate nethod.
(a) Upon receiving the directive of the city to
interconnect, the franchisee shall inrn2diately initiate
negotiations with the other affected cable television
system or systems in order that costs may be shared
equally for both construction and operation of the interconnection link.
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(b) The city council may grant reasonable extensions
of time to interconnect or rescind its request to interconnect
upon petition by the .franchisee to the city council. The
city council shall grant the request if it finds that the
franchisee has negotiated in good faith and the cost of
interconnection would cause an unreasonable increase in
subscriber rates.
(c) No interconnection shall take place without
prior approval of the administrator. A franchisee in
seeking approval for interconnection shall derrXJnstrate
that all signals to be interconnected will comply with
FCC technical standards for all classes of signals and
will result in a low level of distortion.
(d) The franchisee shall cooperate with any
interc0IU1ection corporation, regional interconnection
authority, state or federal regulatory agency which may
be hereafter established for the purpose of regulating,
facilitating, financing or otherwise providing for the
interconnection of cable television systems beyond the
bot.mdaries of the city.
The problem of cost allocation, which could thwart any
plans which might later arise, is again raised here.
Sec. 7B-43, system design, is also relevant.
The cable television system shall be installed in
a manner which will allow each area, if served by a
separate head-end, to distribute and originate programs
to not only the area served by the head-end but to
interconnect with other head-ends, if any, within the
system in order to send or receive originated prograrrrning
from or to any one or rrore areas served by other headends within the city. ·
The Fairfax County Code, Chapter 9, Article 7, includes
the following similar provision:
Section 3.

Extension outside the primary service area.

(a) A Grantee shall extend its full service
outside the PSA to any location within the franchise area
in accordance with the line extension policy incorporated
into the franchise.
(b) To the extent that may be allowed by law, the
County, by resolution, may require a Grantee to interconnect
its cable television system with other cable television
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systems or other broadband cormn.mications facilities
(e.g. , a television corrm.mication network connecting
public institutions or facilities) located within the
County. Such interconnection shall be made 'Within ninety
(90) days of a request made by the County Board of Supervisors pursuant to such a resolution, or 'Within a longer
period of time as may be specified by the Board in its
resolution.
(c) A Grantee shall make every reasonable effort
to cooperate 'With cable television franchise holders in
contiguous conmunities in order to provide cable service
in areas 'Within the County but outside the Granteee's
.Primary Service Area.
(d) The Cornty shall make every reasonable effort
to cooperate 'With the franchising authorities in contiguous
corrmunities, and 'With the Grantee, in order to provide
cable television service in areas outside the Cotmty.
Riclnrond Area
The Richrrond ordinance contains no provision for interconnection
or subdistricting.
Henrico Ordinance No. 458 (1976), Article V,

§

1, D.,

§

2, C and D, states that:
D. 'The Grantee may be required to intercormect
its cable television system 'With other cable television
systems or other broadband corrmunications facilities
located in contiguous corrmunities. Such interconnection
shall be made within ninety (90) days of a request made
by the County Board of Supervisors.
C. Grantee shall make every reasonable effort to
cooperate 'With cable television franchise holders in
contiguous communities in order to provide cable service
in areas within the Cornty but outside the Grantee's
Initial Franchise Area.
D. 'The Cornty shall make every reasonable effort
to cooperate with the franchising authorities in contiguous
corrmmities, and with the Grantee, in order to provide
cable television service in areas outside the County.
A similar provision is included in the Chesterfield
Ordinance in§§ 7.1-6 (c) and 7.1-(c).
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Tricities Area
None of the ord:inances address the issues of regional
operation or networking of subdistricts.

In surrrnary, two po:ints can be made.

Regional operation

of a cable system, with networking with:in the system of subdistricts delineated according to denographic and technical
standards, offers technological and prograrrrning advantages
particularly useful in meet:ing the potential public service
objectives of the medium.

Secondly, however, while the legal

mechanism exists in Virg:inia for such an organization, either of
public or private system operation, that authority, in its
current fonn, will not encourage this approach give.."'! political
realities.

Regional cable networking is not possible :in Virginia

without a departure at the state level from traditional approaches
to local govennnent.

Consequently, this otherwise viable and

useful organizational alternative rema:ins tm.considered, despite
examples of action in other states, despite the apparent advantages, and the potential dangers of inaction, and despite the
failure of local governments to consider these issues on their
own initiative.

CONCLUSION
As Brenda Fox of the NCTA. told the local Government
Attorneys of Virginia in August, 1980, "technology is ahead of
the law, and technology is beating the law" in the cable television field.

This comparison of local regulation of cable

television in Virginia to alternatives suggested by the literature
and even the experience in other states, has dem:mstrated this
to be the case in Virginia.

For the IIDst part, the General

Asserribly has failed to act.

As has been seen, when it did so,

it was only in response to the local initiative offered by
Arlington County, and local initiative has itself been limited
due to the legislature's failure to grant sufficient authority
or support to local government. What has resulted is a regulatory scheme in which the legislature has determined that there
should be regulation in the .public interest, but in which the
regulation has been left to localities which have neither the
resources, the legal authority, nor the political inclination,
to do so effectively and with flexibility.

In fairness, it can be noted that lack of legislative
action, even given the potential implications of developm2Ilt of
cable television, should not be surprising.

The considerable

changes in the technological, economic and legal aspects of the
medium in the last five years, and the resulting rush for

95

96
franchises, could be expected to engender a cautious response,
or no response at all, eithe;r- on the basis of ignorance or
uncertainty.

Other aspects of the industry, evimmt in the

Virginia experience, could also elicit a limited response.

It

has been observed, concerning national regulation, that
[i]n a field such as corrmmications where the
interests of powerful industry forces frequently collide
with one another as well as with the interests of the
general public, nothing is m:Jre unsettling to many
lawmakers . . . than the prospect of rrak:ing a law. 186
Instead, the Congress has chosen to rely on "a variety of infonnal
techniques in directing and overseeing the activities of the
F.C.C. ," such as hearings, investigations and studies, despite
the fact, noted by Chief Justice Burger in U. S. v. Midwest Video,
that " . . . the alm:>st explosive developrrent of CA.TV suggests
the need for a comprehensive reexamination of the statutory
scheme . . . . 11187
What is required in Virginia, however, is not reexamination,
but comprehensive initial examination.
not been the experience described here.

Unfortunately, such has
While it would be

presumptuous to reach policy canclusions in a field in such
rapid development and of such an uncertain nature, the Virginia
experience definitely raises an agenda of issues to be addressed
at the one level of government which as yet, for the m:Jst part,
has remained out of the cable regulatory arena.

If a decision

is made that Virginia law should play a direct role in the

186Erwin G. Krasnow and Lawrence D. Longley, The Politics
of Broadcast Regulation, 2nd ed. (New York: St. :Martin's Press,
1978), p. 90.
187Ibid.
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future of cable television, then the following legal issues,
anong many others, would be addressed in the construction of a
regulatory scheme:
1.

The Virginia Freedom of Infonnation Act could be

amended to impose guidelines for the franchising process which
would assure public awareness and impact upon the process, for
example, by regulating ex parte cormrunications between governing
body members and bidders, and post-bid submissions of additional
information and bid amendments.

The experiences in Richnnnd and

Alexandria were illustrative of such due process problems, and,
on a m::>re positive note, the standards imposed in Chesterfield
and Falls Church offer examples of local initiative to fill the
void;
2.

The Virginia Conflict of Interests Act could, at the

very least, address the issue of public official interest in
cable finns;
3.

Va. Code § 15.1-23. l could be expanded into a ID'.)re

comprehensive state cable camnunications policy, imposing a
mandatory duty upon the localities to regulate, with substantial
state oversight, thereby removing the serious limitations placed
on legal authority by the Lafayette and Boulder cases cited
above.

Beyond this, however, an expanded state regulatory

mandate could be used to fill the vacumn in which local governments can consider factors irrelevant to cormrunity service by
cable, such as "rent-a-citizen" political concerns, petty
interjurisdictional rivalries, and increased local revenue.
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Other vague standards for perfonnance are offered by the
franchising process itself, .which is ripe for public confusion
and litigation, since franchising for the use of public property
was never intended for application to a rapidly developing
corrm.mications teclmology.

Many of the issues involved in

Cablecom v. Ricbmmd speak in favor of correcting this shortcoming.

Also, flexibility to rreet future technological develop-

ments could be built into the process, a reservation of authority
rarely seen in the Virginia experience so far;
4.

As a part of this policy, the state could eliminate

some of the current limitations on local action, as in delineating
cable corrmunications service districts reasonably related to the
social impact and teclmological characteristics of the rredium.
Given the Virginia political environment, it is probably m:>st
realistic to assume that local governments would continue to
exercise franchising authority within such districts.

Exercise

of this authority, however, might be subject to state certification of compliance with service, networking, and subdistricting
standards.

Among the advantages of such an approach would be

both the elimination of unrealistic bidding for marginal franchises, in order to establish a "stepping stone" in future
bidding; and of unrealistic ownership diversity due primarily to
local jurisdictional rivalries;
5.

In light of the fact that federal technical standards

may eventually be eliminated, and the fact that even Virginia
localities with sophisticated staff capabilities are unable to
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adequately impose such standards, a detennination could be made
as to the extent to which cqble television is a utility, and to
which such standards should be prorrrulgated by the S. C. C.

That

is not to say that a new separate conmission or the Public
Telecormn.m.ications Board might not perfonn this function IlK)re
appropriately, especially in the event of a legislative determination that cable services are not a utility, or that the
issue of deregulation should not also be addressed.

Also to be

considered, if utility status is granted, could be rate regulation, on which the Arlington and Alexandria situations derronstrate the inability of even sophisticated localities to act, as
well as the susceptibility of the process to political pressure.
The financing issue, a consistently important one in this capital
intensive field, and one with 'Which Virginia localities have,
alrrost without exception, had difficulty dealing could be examined.
This last point is especially important, given the rapidly
mm.m.ting corrroitments of several MSO' s in Virginia in an enterprise where little short-tenn profit is available and where
public purpose demands could legitimately be made on future
significant profit; and
6.

Various ownership alternatives for Virginia localities

should be investigated, such as municipal or public authority
ownership or operation, of either plant of prograrrming or both.
The alternatives offered in the experience studied here have,
alrrost without exception, been those presented by the industry.
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This is not to suggest the nature of effective regulation
in Virginia, or that deregulation to the fullest possible extent
might not offer the best alternative.

On

this point, the

national experience in carm.mications regulation is enlightening.
The F. C. C. has tended to regulate in favor of those whom existing
regulations have rrost benefited, the major entities in the rredia
status quo as opposed to those requiring innovative approaches
to technology or new standards for regulation.

This has been

the case largely because any regulator easily can be overwhelmed
in a field of major technological development and rapidly
expanding market demand.

Such situations, as with citizens band

radio for example, have lead historically to a reactive regulatory
role, rather than a guiding one, as the regulator becorres dependent
itself on the major industries for guidance.

'These situations

have also lead in many cases, including the Federal regulation
of cable television, to the stiffling of legislative and regulatory
action by those industries with the IIDst power to do so, those
being the industries most heavily invested in m:rintaining the
current legal and technical environment.188 In this way it is
possible, although not necessarily certain, that regulation can
actually have results contrary to the public interest in increased media service.

If experience is an accurate guide, it

cannot be expected that rrore aggressive cable regulation in
Virginia would be i.rrmtme from this potential pitfall.

The

record described in this paper, in fact, is one replete with
188Krasnow, pp. 21, 30, 80, 171.
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acquiescence by local goverrnnents with limited resources to
industry initiative, and MSQ' s willing to use that situation to
their benefit to a significant degree.

It cannot be guaranteed

at this point that a rrore aggressive approach at the state level
would have better support, or be any rrore independent of industrial influence in attempting to IIEet public objectives.

Perhaps relatively rroderate regulation is the best that
can be expected at either the state or local level.

Perhaps

such a limited approach even may be the rrost suited to the
achieverrent of public objectives.

It has been observed in the

literature that
the public interest may require in a highly
complex, politically sensitive and rapidly changing
industry at rrost a regulatory objective of m:Jdest
change, flexibility and sensitivity to feedback, and
a focus on short range goals.189
In such a situation, it may simply ask too rrnlch to expect

specific long range goals or dramatic changes of direction.
Perhaps such a limited process is the best possible, and certainly it is the rrost likely.

Nonetheless, it should include at

least one actor whose primary objective is the protection and
fostering of the public interest.

As has been seen above, even

the possibility of a reactive regulatory role is increasingly
threatened in Virginia, as local governments fail to retain the
authority to meet technological developments with a flexible
response.

This study has discovered little action on the part

189Krasnow, pp. 187-194.
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of the Cormonwealth to discourage this practice, either by
enhancing the competence of the localities to regulate, or by
increasing the awareness of this potential problem by imposing
its consideration as a part of the franchising process.

The

current situation does not appear to be one designed to regulate
in the public interest in a limited, practical marmer.

Rather,

it appears to be one in which a decision has been made, largely
by default, to regulate, but to do so hardly at all.
The future of cable television in Virginia for at least a
decade has to a large extent been set within the last four
years, as many major jurisdictions have awarded franchises.

In

the three major metropolitan areas studied here, Arlington,
Alexandria, Henrico, Richm:md and Chesterfield have issued
franchises for state-of-the-art systems, and Petersburg, Hopewell,
and Colonial Heights are bom.d for several years to antiquated
systems.

If the Corrm:mwealth is to play any significant role in

what little remains of the process, then General Assembly action,
as opposed to minimal reaction, is imperative.

Theoretically,

the decision could justifiably be in favor of any number of
regulatory alternatives, including even a terrporary IIDratorium
on cable system authorizations m.til basic policy decisions can
be made and i.mtil the future of the rredium becorres more certain.
This could be justified on the grom.ds that the situation at
present is too uncertain to allow the substantial bargaining
away of public rights, or major investment of private or public
capital.

As

to regulation itself, the extrem=s rm. from total
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state preemption, to total deregulation except for the rrnst
nrinirnal standards for the use of public rights of way.
listically, the options are much rrore limited.

Rea-

Just as there is

at the state level a legal void as to cable regulation, there is
a related political one, also evident in this paper.

Greater

authority for the localities to regulate, or to take advantage
of regional alternatives, is unlikely given Virginia's traditional
approach to local governmental authority.

Under the principles

and experience which underlie the Dillon Rule, local iniative,
even if not specifically prohibited, is certainly not encouraged,
as any effort of Fairfax County to operate its own system will
most likely dem:mstrate.

This is also not to say that past

experience indicates that authority given would be used, as with
regional franchising, and given the traditional parochial.outlook
of Virginia localities.
That decision, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
What is apparent, based upon this study of the issues of regulatory
authority, expertise, and organization alone, is the lack of any
comprehensive analysis of the Virginia regulatory environment for
cable television, and the inability of local government to regulate
effectively in the field without such guidance.
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